The Legislative Legacy of Congressional Campaigns

Abstract

Do members of Congress follow through on the appeals they make in campaigns? The answer to this question lies at the heart of assessments of democratic legitimacy. This study demonstrates that, contrary to the conventional wisdom that candidates' appeals are just 'cheap talk', campaigns actually have a lasting legacy in the content of representatives' and senators' behavior in office. Levels of promise-keeping vary in a systematic fashion across legislators, across types of activity, across time and across chamber. Moreover, legislators' responsiveness to their appeals shapes their future electoral fortunes and career choices, and their activity on their campaign themes leaves a tangible trace in public policy outputs. Understanding the dynamics of promise-keeping thus has important implications for our evaluations of the quality of campaigns and the strength of representation in the United States.

What Gets Rewarded? Legislative Activity and Constituency Approval

“…Sulkin (2005Sulkin ( , 2011, for example, finds that legislators who take up their previous challengers' issue critiques and who follow through on their own campaign appeals at high rates do better in the next election than their colleagues who engage in less of these behaviors. Legislative effectiveness may yield similar dividends (Miquel and Snyder 2006;Volden and Wiseman 2014).…”

“…As a number of scholars have shown, local news coverage can be a useful and informative source for voters about MCs' actions (Arnold 2004;Fogarty 2008Fogarty , 2011Hayes and Lawless 2014;Snyder and Stromberg 2010). Other constituents may learn about an MC's accomplishments through his or her press releases (Grimmer 2013), website or social media outreach (Druckman, Kifer, and Parkin 2009;Evans, Cordova, and Sipole 2014;Lassen and Brown 2011), or through the campaign appeals of the incumbent or opponent (Sides 2006(Sides , 2007Sulkin 2005Sulkin , 2011. Still others may glean some information through the efforts of interest groups and other associations, or by talking with friends, neighbors, and coworkers (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995;Klofstad 2007;Mutz and Mondak 2006;Sokhey and McClurg 2012).…”

“…We also measure party loyalty (the percentage of the time the MC "cheats" on the party by voting against the party on roll calls where 50% of the Democrats vote against 50% of Republicans), volume of lawmaking activity (number of bill and joint resolution introductions, cosponsorships, and amendments), legislative success ("hit rate," the proportion of introduced measures that passed in the chamber), percentage of roll call votes missed, public visibility (number of one-minute speeches the MC makes on the floor and "bylines"-the number of editorials he or she writes for state or national newspapers), and district attention (number of district offices established by the MC, and the proportion of an MC's staff allocated to the district rather than DC). 10 Finally, we match the responses of individuals to the "Most Important Problem" question (coded by CCES as falling into one of eighteen categories in 2006 and one of fifteen categories in 2008) to Sulkin's (2011) codes for bill introductions and cosponsorships. This enables us to determine whether or not each MC introduced at least one measure dealing with that issue.…”

The Politics of Credit in Presidential Signing Statements

“…Casework and particularized policy benefits not only increase a member's electoral support but also help to build bonds with constituents that can scare off would-be challengers (Jacobson 2004). Sulkin's (2011) work examines the vital linkage between campaign appeals and legislative activity of members of Congress. Her analysis of promise keeping provides insight into early stages of issue interest development and the investment of MCs in legislative activity.…”

Partisan Polarization and Legislators’ Agendas

“…15 Campaign agendas are also a function of MCs' previous governing priorities, so, for example, their committee assignments influence their choices of issues, and these assignments necessarily include both Democrats and Republicans. 16 This all suggests that agendas are affected by factors beyond just MCs' ideological and partisan leanings. This may be even more the case for legislative agendas relative to campaign agendas, as there are more institutional constraints on the former than the latter.…”