The (im)possibilities of disaster risk reduction in the context of high-intensity conflict: the case of Afghanistan

Abstract

Conflict aggravates disaster risk and impact through increased vulnerability and weakened response capacities. Disaster risk reduction (DRR) and disaster governance are neededbut often deemed unfeasiblein conflict-affected areas. In Afghanistan, despite the high-intensity conflict (HIC), there is a growing body of practice on DRR. To provide insight on DRR in HIC contexts, this study used document analysis, stakeholder interviews, and participant observation to analyse the promotion, implementation, and challenges of DRR in Afghanistan. The findings show that DRR was promoted after international recognition of Afghanistan's high disaster risk, which coincided with expanding opportunities for development. Early Afghan DRR projects were hazard-oriented and focused on mitigation infrastructure, but some have shifted towards an integrated approach. DRR is challenging in HIC contexts because of complex logistical and funding needs required to overcome access and security issues. The Afghan experience shows that DRR is possible in HIC countries, provided that different levels of conflict are acknowledged, sufficient time and funding are available, and disaster governance arrangements are in place. Expectations regarding the possibilities for DRR in HIC areas should be tempered by the realities of limitations in terms of geographical coverage, real impact, and capacities to reduce vulnerability in an integrated way.

Assemblage theory and disaster risk management

“…To illustrate how this principle of the DRM Assemblage analytical approach could be used, we consider the findings of Mena and Hilhorst (2020) through the lens of the DRM Assemblage. Mena and Hilhorst (2020) show that the futures-in-the-making of the DRM Assemblage of Afghanistan are shaped more by the imagination of geopolitical risk , and the continued territorialisation of International NGOs in the governance of disaster risk in the country, rather than the deterritorialisation of vulnerable futures for those most at risk.…”

“…To illustrate how this principle of the DRM Assemblage analytical approach could be used, we consider the findings of Mena and Hilhorst (2020) through the lens of the DRM Assemblage. Mena and Hilhorst (2020) show that the futures-in-the-making of the DRM Assemblage of Afghanistan are shaped more by the imagination of geopolitical risk , and the continued territorialisation of International NGOs in the governance of disaster risk in the country, rather than the deterritorialisation of vulnerable futures for those most at risk. They show how DRR projects are more likely to materialise in places which are deemed safe by the Afghan government: places not affected by conflict or under the control of insurgent groups and where the NGO has a track record of implementing projects on time and in line with outputs requested by their donors.…”

“…They show how DRR projects are more likely to materialise in places which are deemed safe by the Afghan government: places not affected by conflict or under the control of insurgent groups and where the NGO has a track record of implementing projects on time and in line with outputs requested by their donors. Mena and Hilhorst (2020: 14–15) report that easily visible, quickly created and measurable outputs relating to imagined composite single hazards – such as flood defence walls – tended to materialise; as opposed to ‘soft’, long-term, complex and quantitatively immeasurable outputs which do more to reduce the risk of both future disasters and future conflicts. In conclusion, Mena and Hilhorst (2020) argue that DRR projects in Afghanistan tend not to speak to the needs of those they are intended to support, lead to the materialisation of infrastructures which can create conflict over natural resources and do little to address the continued territorialisation of vulnerability for the most at-risk populations in the country.…”

Beyond disaster vulnerabilities: An empirical investigation of the causal pathways linking conflict to disaster risks

“…Despite the potentially increased need for disaster risk reduction (DRR) in conflict-affected regions, conventional DRR does not take conflict into consideration in its design and delivery , and it is built around the normative assumption that peace is a necessary precondition for action . DRR is often seen as impossible to implement particularly in regions embroiled in high-intensity conflict, and disaster-related activities are relegated to the provision of limited disaster response and relief (Mena & Hilhorst, 2020). This lack of knowledge and targeted action leaves the roughly 1.8 billion people living in war-torn and fragile areas (OECD, 2018) most likely to be left behind in the global commitment to DRR (Peters, 2019) while they disproportionately endure preventable disaster-related losses to life, livelihoods, health, and assets.…”

Climate change adaptation in conflict-affected countries: A systematic assessment of evidence

“…Despite these fragile contexts, people living in these conflict-affected areas are still coping and adapting to climate change, although there is often little support from private sources, national or international institutions. Donors are risk-averse to making large contributions of adaptation finance in conflict-affected zones due to the unpredictable circumstances, and instead tend to prioritize adaptation funding for countries and regions with stable governance [ 32 , 48 , 72 ]. Additionally, climate adaptation research contains a strong bias towards stable and easy-to-reach locations [ 3 , 30 ].…”