1986
DOI: 10.1177/009539978601800204
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Abstract: Regulatory agencies are governed by a top committee rather than a single, chief executive, but the chair of the committee (or board) often dominates decisions. This article addresses the question of why the Federal Reserve Board chairman dominates the decisions of the Federal Open Market Committee—the monetary policy arm of the Fed-even though he has little formal authority. It examines four internal strategies of the chair: side payments, policy trade-offs, use of expert staff and control of policy implementa… Show more

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Cited by 10 publications
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“…After this maximal point, FOMC members in a highly seasoned setting will be less likely to dissent because (1) they will possess more maturity by placing a greater premium on policy cohesion; and (2) a highly experienced FOMC will accumulate more internal power (in terms of professional security and actual expertise of the monetary policy making process), thus exerting greater influence on proposed policy actions by the Fed chair than a less experienced FOMC. In addition, Knott (1986) provides evidence that Arthur Burns placed a much greater premium on policy consensus than other Fed chairs. 15 As a result, a dummy variable equaling one during his tenure chair, zero otherwise is included in the model.…”
Section: Miscellaneous Factorsmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…After this maximal point, FOMC members in a highly seasoned setting will be less likely to dissent because (1) they will possess more maturity by placing a greater premium on policy cohesion; and (2) a highly experienced FOMC will accumulate more internal power (in terms of professional security and actual expertise of the monetary policy making process), thus exerting greater influence on proposed policy actions by the Fed chair than a less experienced FOMC. In addition, Knott (1986) provides evidence that Arthur Burns placed a much greater premium on policy consensus than other Fed chairs. 15 As a result, a dummy variable equaling one during his tenure chair, zero otherwise is included in the model.…”
Section: Miscellaneous Factorsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These studies have explored the roles of leadership, legislative change, and institutional structure of the courts on judicial consensus. Also, in the area of monetary policy making, scholars have examined variations in the'level of cot~sensus across different Federal Reserve chairs (e.g., Belden, 1989;Havrilesky and Schweizer, 1990;Havrilesky and Gildea~ 1992;Knott, 1986). This preceding work involving policy cohesion and the Federal Reserve, however, has only examined the individual differences that may (or may not) exist among commission chairs.…”
Section: Past Research On Consensual Decision Makingmentioning
confidence: 99%
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