The evolutionary game analysis and simulation with system dynamics of manufacturer's emissions abatement behavior under cap-and-trade regulation

Zhang, Suyong; Wang, Chuanxu; Yu, Chao

doi:10.1016/j.amc.2019.02.080

Cited by 94 publications

(50 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…Liu et al [3] analyzed the impact of income inequality on carbon emission in the US and found that income inequality exacerbates carbon emissions in the US in the short term, while it promotes carbon emission reductions in the long run. Zhang et al [4] found that the probability of the manufacturer introducing green technology was negatively correlated with the cost of government intervention, and it was positively correlated with punishment by the government for the manufacturer’s speculative behavior. Considering both economic and energy goals, Ye et al [5] established a dual-objective programming model that integrated 3E goals with quota allocation issues.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Dynamic Price Game Model in a Low-Carbon, Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Return Rates and Fairness Concern Behaviors

Shi

Huang

2019

IJERPH

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In this paper, we developed a dynamic price game model for a low-carbon, closed-loop supply chain system in which (1) the manufacturer had fairness concern and carbon emission reduction (CER) behaviors, and market share and profit maximization were their objectives, and (2) the retailer showed fairness concern behaviors in market competition and provided service input to reduce return rates. The retailer recycled old products from customers, and the manufacturer remanufactured the recycled old products. The effects of different parameter values on the stability and utility of the dynamic price game model were determined through analysis and numerical simulation. Results found that an increasing customer loyalty to the direct marketing channel decreased the stable region of the manufacturer’s price adjustment and increase that of the retailer. The stable region of the system shrank with an increase of CER and the retailer’s service level, which expanded with return rates. The dynamic system entered into chaos through flip bifurcation with the increase of price adjustment speed. In the chaotic state, the average utilities of the manufacturer and retailer all declined, while that of the retailer declined even more. Changes to parameter values had a great impact on the utilities of the manufacturer and retailer. By selecting appropriate control parameters, the dynamic system can return to a stable state from chaos again. The research of this paper is of great significance to participants’ price decision-making and supply chain operation management.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Dynamic Price Game Model in a Low-Carbon, Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Return Rates and Fairness Concern Behaviors

Shi

Huang

2019

IJERPH

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“…Zhu et al studied the optimal evolutionary path of low-carbon investment strategies and found that an incentive mechanism based on government subsidies is crucial to achieve co-investment, and effective action should be taken to improve the assessment accuracy and supervisory efficiency [ 54 ]. Zhang et al found that it is crucial to implement dynamic carbon trading pricing policies, and government intervention costs and fines play a certain role in promoting carbon emission reduction [ 55 ]. Shan et al analyzed the strategic choices and behavioral characteristics of carbon emission reduction activities among producers, consumers, and decomposers, and further discussed the influences and decisions of the players [ 56 ].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Implementation of a Multi-Agent Carbon Emission Reduction Strategy under the Chinese Dual Governance System: An Evolutionary Game Theoretical Approach

Wang

You

Liu

et al. 2020

IJERPH

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A central-local dual governance system is the basic system of environmental governance in China. Co-governance between the central environmental protection department (CEPD) and local environmental protection departments (LEPDs) is an important means to effectively promote China’s carbon emission reduction strategy. Accordingly, this paper discusses their interactive decision-making and investigates how to optimize the strategic relationships between the CEPD, LEPDs, and carbon emission enterprises (CEEs) under the dual governance system by constructing a trilateral evolutionary game model and analyzing evolutionary stability strategies, achieving a numerical experiment simulation of evolution processes and determining the impacts of various factors using MATLAB, leading to several countermeasures and suggestions. The results indicate that the CEPD should rationally use the incentive mechanism for LEPDs, improve the carbon tax system, and further penalize the nepotistic relationship of LEPDs and CEEs. Furthermore, it is essential to reform the current LEPD performance evaluation system and reduce the cost of LEPD positive regulation through subsidies and financial transfer payments. Additionally, the CEE strategy is affected by carbon reduction tax rates, penalties, subsides, and emission reduction costs and revenues. This study reveals the consequences of interactions between CEPD, LEPDs, and CEEs and presents options for the redesign of incentive and regulatory mechanisms to improve carbon emission reduction performance in China.

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“…Mahmoudi and Rasti-Barzoki [59] designed the contrast between government and producer under different scenarios by using a two-population evolutionary game theory approach. Zhang et al [60] used evolutionary game theory to analyze the impacts of government policy on the decisions of manufacturers and the dynamic tendency of cap-and-trade market. Chen and Hu [61] applied evolutionary game theory to examine the behavioral strategies of the manufacturers in response to various combinations of carbon taxes and subsidies.…”

Section: Literature On Evolutionary Game Theory and Its Applicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Three-Player for Low-Carbon Production Capacity Sharing

et al. 2019

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In the era of the sharing economy, the rise of production capacity sharing has changed traditional manufacturing modes and broken the balance of original production systems. In addition to that environmental-friendly manufacturing enterprises are of great significance with regard to production capacity sharing and sustainable development of the ecology environment. To investigate the decision-making behaviors of the participants involved in low-carbon production capacity sharing, an evolutionary game model taking into account the platforms, manufacturing enterprises with idle production capacity, and those with demanding production capacity is constructed. Then, both evolutionary game theory and Lyapunov stability theorem are used to analyze the asymptotic stability of the equilibrium and evolutionary stability strategies of the system. Besides, the economic and managerial significance of the evolutionary stability strategy is given. Finally, the influence of low-carbon production capacity of enterprises on the stability of the dynamic system is discussed, such as the cost effect of low-carbon production capacity, the effect of transaction cost, and so on. Results indicate that they can provide theoretical reference for decision-making with respect to the platforms, manufacturing enterprises, and sustainable development of the dynamic system.

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The evolutionary game analysis and simulation with system dynamics of manufacturer's emissions abatement behavior under cap-and-trade regulation

Cited by 94 publications

References 28 publications

A Dynamic Price Game Model in a Low-Carbon, Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Return Rates and Fairness Concern Behaviors

A Dynamic Price Game Model in a Low-Carbon, Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Return Rates and Fairness Concern Behaviors

Implementation of a Multi-Agent Carbon Emission Reduction Strategy under the Chinese Dual Governance System: An Evolutionary Game Theoretical Approach

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Three-Player for Low-Carbon Production Capacity Sharing

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