The evolution of group dispersal with leaders and followers

Koykka, Cody; Wild, Geoff

doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.02.008

Cited by 10 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…These dynamics are similar to those in other producer-scrounger models [23,24]. Stable differences in propensities to lead dispersal attempts arise when dispersal decreases competition between kin; the net fitness benefits of leadership depend upon the costs of dispersal as well as on the degrees of relatedness and reproductive skew within dispersal groups [25].…”

Section: Movementsupporting

confidence: 69%

Leadership in Mammalian Societies: Emergence, Distribution, Power, and Payoff

Smith

Gavrilets

Mulder

et al. 2016

Trends in Ecology & Evolution

127

132

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Section: Movementsupporting

confidence: 69%

Leadership in Mammalian Societies: Emergence, Distribution, Power, and Payoff

Smith

Gavrilets

Mulder

et al. 2016

Trends in Ecology & Evolution

127

132

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“…This means that dispersal should have little or no influence on the evolution of cooperation. Budding dispersal, where related individuals disperse in groups, may favour cooperation because it decreases kin competition while maintaining high levels of relatedness (Krushelnycky, Loope & Joe, ; Gardner & West, ; Kümmerli et al , ; Hui & Pinter‐Wollman, ; Koykka & Wild, ).…”

Section: Dispersalmentioning

confidence: 99%

Behavioural synchronization of large‐scale animal movements – disperse alone, but migrate together?

et al. 2016

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Dispersal and migration are superficially similar large-scale movements, but which appear to differ in terms of inter-individual behavioural synchronization. Seasonal migration is a striking example of coordinated behaviour, enabling animal populations to track spatio-temporal variation in ecological conditions. By contrast, for dispersal, while social context may influence an individual's emigration and settlement decisions, transience is believed to be mostly a solitary behaviour. Here, we review differences in drivers that may explain why migration appears to be more synchronized than dispersal. We derive the prediction that the contrast in the importance of behavioural synchronization between dispersal and migration is linked to differences in the selection pressures that drive their respective evolution. Although documented examples of collective dispersal are rare, this behaviour may be more common than currently believed, with important consequences for eco-evolutionary dynamics. Crucially, to date, there is little available theory for predicting when we should expect collective dispersal to evolve, and we also lack empirical data to test predictions across species. By reviewing the state of the art in research on migration and collective movements, we identify how we can harness these advances, both in terms of theory and data collection, to broaden our understanding of synchronized dispersal and its importance in the context of global change.

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“…in (1). This situation is frequently omitted from the consideration of the prisoner's dilemma game, but there are straightforward examples, where it can be realized 7 . We note that under (27), function L(x) locally minimizes at x = 1, and maximizes at p * 2 = 1, i.e.…”

Section: The Case T > 2rmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The phenomenon of leadership is studied in various disciplines (biology, psychology, sociology, management science) and led to a big literature; see [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9] for reviews. Still there is a common opinion that the research on leadership lacks integrity [9,10].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Leadership scenarios in prisoner’s dilemma game

Babajanyan

Melkikh

Allahverdyan

2020

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications

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The prisoner's dilemma game is the most known contribution of game theory into social sciences. Here we describe new implications of this game for transactional and transformative leadership. While the autocratic (Stackelberg's) leadership is inefficient for this game, we discuss a Paretooptimal scenario, where the leader L commits to react probabilistically to pure strategies of the follower F, which is free to make the first move. Offering F to resolve the dilemma, L is able to get a larger average pay-off. The exploitation can be stabilized via repeated interaction of L and F, and turns to be more stable than the egalitarian regime, where the pay-offs of L and F are equal. The total (summary) pay-off of the exploiting regime is never larger than in the egalitarian case. We discuss applications of this solution to a soft method of fighting corruption and to modeling the Machiavellian leadership. Whenever the defection benefit is large, the optimal strategies of F are mixed, while the summary pay-off is maximal. One mechanism for sustaining this solution is that L recognizes intentions of F.

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The evolution of group dispersal with leaders and followers

Cited by 10 publications

References 34 publications

Leadership in Mammalian Societies: Emergence, Distribution, Power, and Payoff

Leadership in Mammalian Societies: Emergence, Distribution, Power, and Payoff

Behavioural synchronization of large‐scale animal movements – disperse alone, but migrate together?

Leadership scenarios in prisoner’s dilemma game

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