The European Central Bank: Institutional Aspects

Smits, R.

doi:10.1017/s0020589300059017

Cited by 28 publications

(20 citation statements)

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“…In institutional terms, the ECB can act independently and will have a legal personality (Art. 106 (2) EC Treaty), and its authority does not emanate from a community institution (Smits 1997). Even more signi cant for institutional independence of the ECB Journal of European Public Policy is its statute which is set out in a separate protocol and 'most of the provisions of this protocol can only be changed through an amendment to the EC Treaty' (Gormley and de Haan 1996: 101).…”

Section: Self-regulatory Institutions: Independent Central Banksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Globalization and the changing architecture of the state: the regulatory state and the politics of negative co-ordination

Jayasuriya¹

2001

Journal of European Public Policy

135

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Globalization is recon guring the modern state. Differences in types of co-ordination are pivotal to understanding the changing nature of the state. These changes are best captured in Scharpf's distinction between positive and negative co-ordination which can be used to explore the mutations of the state. In place of those state structures which provided a framework for bargaining -be it corporatism or the developmental state -it is argued that emergent forms of coordination of economic behavior provide a procedural foundation for the selfregulation of economic governance. One signi cant exemplar of the emergence of this new state architecture is the growing importance of independent central banks in the management of monetary policy. The article explores these issues through an analysis of changes in central bank independence in Western Europe and East Asia.

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Section: Self-regulatory Institutions: Independent Central Banksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Globalization and the changing architecture of the state: the regulatory state and the politics of negative co-ordination

Jayasuriya¹

2001

Journal of European Public Policy

135

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“…28 Louis (1995) 57, Pipkorn (1994 282. 29 Smits (1997) 92f, Häde (1999 Art 107 para 2, Hahn/Häde (2001) 33, Weinbörner (1999) 384, Stadler (1996 166 and Louis (1995) 56. 30 "überwölbendes Dach", Stadler (1996) 88ff.…”

Section: Excess Reserves -Their Counterparts On the Liabilities Sidementioning

confidence: 99%

Excess reserves in the Eurosystem: an economic and legal analysis

Badinger¹,

Dutzler²

2003

Institutional, Legal and Economic Aspects of the EMU

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Estimates suggest that international reserves of the Eurosystem could be reduced by one third to half ($130-$170 bill.) of its existing level after the introduction of the Euro. While the ultimate decision, whether and how to use these excessive reserves (public debt repayment, financing of a fund, financing of a tax cut) is a political one, some general results can be stated: First, since reserves earn interest revenue, a large part of which is transferred to the government anyway, moderate (but still positive) economic gains can be expected from a reserve reduction. Second, reserve reductions exceeding a certain threshold require the ECB's approval, which could, however, only be rejected if the envisaged measures were inconsistent with the ECB's monetary and exchange rate policy. Given that unintended macroeconomic effects can easily be avoided by a carefully planned and coordinated reserve reduction, such a rejection by the ECB -which is subject to the review by the European Court of Justice -is only hard to justify. Equally important from a legal point of view is that reserve reductions, effected as transfer of an extraordinary gain to the government, do not constitute monetary financing as prohibited under Art. 101 EC Treaty. Finally, reducing reserves to an adequate level would also eliminate incompatibilities and conflicts of interest between monetary and investment policy by the central banks and reduce their field of operation to their core task: the conduct of monetary policy. Thus, a carefully planned and coordinated reserve reduction can be supported from both an economic as well as legal point of view.

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“…106 (2) EC Treaty); its authority does not emanate from a community institution. 37 Even more significantly, the institutional independence of the ECB is ensured by statute; interestingly, this is set out in a separate protocol which stipulates that "most of the provisions of this protocol can only be changed through an amendment to the EC Treaty." 38 In short, these provisions mean that the independence of the ECB is constitutionalized in a way that distinguishes it from even highly independent central banks at the national level.…”

Section: Fragmentation Of Sovereignty and The New Ordo-liberalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Globalization, Sovereignty, and the Rule of Law: From Political to Economic Constitutionalism?

Jayasuriya¹

2001

Constellations

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The European Central Bank: Institutional Aspects

Cited by 28 publications

References 0 publications

Globalization and the changing architecture of the state: the regulatory state and the politics of negative co-ordination

Globalization and the changing architecture of the state: the regulatory state and the politics of negative co-ordination

Excess reserves in the Eurosystem: an economic and legal analysis

Globalization, Sovereignty, and the Rule of Law: From Political to Economic Constitutionalism?

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