The EU Tobacco Products Directive must not be derailed

Belcher, Paul; Kosinska, Monika

doi:10.1016/s0140-6736(12)61774-7

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…Many questioned whether Dalli's alleged misconduct justified his punishment, given that Dalli had not benefited personally, and the text of the proposal had not changed as a consequence. 85 86 The Commission's decision came under further scrutiny when the secret OLAF report 87 was leaked, presenting only circumstantial evidence against Dalli, retrieved using seriously flawed methods. 8 88 89 OLAF concluded, inter alia, that Dalli's unofficial contacts with snus lobbyists (two meetings in total, both in Malta and occurring at the request of Swedish Match and the European Smokeless Tobacco Council (ESTOC)) had not been publicly disclosed and were a breach of the Commissioner's Code of Conduct and the FCTC's Article 5.3.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The revision of the 2014 European tobacco products directive: an analysis of the tobacco industry's attempts to ‘break the health silo’

et al. 2015

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Background After five years of intense lobbying on 3rd April 2014 the European Union (EU) enacted a revised Tobacco Products Directive (TPD). However, unlike previous legislation on tobacco, this occurred in a changed policy context, following adoption of both the EU's ‘Smart Regulation’ agenda that the transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) anticipated would increase their policy influence, and Article 5.3 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) which seeks to prevent TTC influence. This study aims to explore the scale and nature of the TTCs’ lobby against the EU TPD and evaluate how these developments have affected their ability to exert influence. Methods Analysis of 581 documents obtained through freedom of information requests, 28 leaked Philip Morris International (PMI) documents, 17 TTC documents obtained via the Legacy Library, web content obtained via Google alerts and searches of the EU institutions’ websites, plus four stakeholder interviews. Results The TTC lobby was massive, with Philip Morris alone employing over 160 lobbyists. Strategies were directed in large part via third parties. Efforts to “Push” (amend) or “Delay” the proposal and block “extreme policy options”, including plain packaging and a point of sales display ban were partially successful. Both were removed from the Directive during its progress through the Commission where a delay of three years occurred. These changes and delays followed a series of meetings between TTC representatives (including ex-Commission employees) and high level Commission staff and were enabled by the operationalisation of Smart Regulation via stakeholder consultation and impact assessment. Contrary to Article 5.3, these meetings were not disclosed. Conclusions During the legislative process, Article 5.3 was not consistently applied by non-health Directorates of the European Commission, while the tools of Smart Regulation appear to have facilitated TTC access to, and influence on, the 2014 TPD. The use of third parties undermines Article 5.3.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The revision of the 2014 European tobacco products directive: an analysis of the tobacco industry's attempts to ‘break the health silo’

et al. 2015

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“…The tobacco industry has been implicated in surveillance, subterfuge, bribery, and corruption in Africa (Tobacco Tactics, 2021a;Titeca et al, 2011;Jackson et al, 2021). Tobacco companies were also implicated in a break-in at health policy offices in Brussels, which led to the undermining of a European Union Tobacco Products Directive in 2012 (McKee et al, 2012). Money laundering, fraud, terrorism, and organized crime are all inextricably entwined (Perri & Brody, 2011).…”

Section: Neoliberalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

A healthy state? Geopolitics, health, and safety: A keynote presentation for the European Conference of Law Enforcement and Public Health

Middleton

2023

JCSWB

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Law enforcement and public health agencies operate in the context of their national government policies and resources. But improving and protecting health and community safety are made more difficult by four dark geopolitical forces which have been accelerating in recent years. Neoliberalism is driving governments to pursue low tax, low regulation small-state policies and aiding the expansion of uncontrolled globalization and colonialization of health-damaging manufacturing and services by multinational companies. The “Sovereign individuals,” first described in 1997, are the super-rich who have mastery over information technologies to avoid taxes and hide their wealth from governments. The vast offshoring of wealth has led to increasing inequalities in wealth and health, between rich and poor, further adding to civil distrust and unrest. Loss of revenues prevents government funding of health, welfare, and public protection whilst creating greater need for it. To explain the increasing poverty and harshness of life for the masses, there has been a rebirth and rise of populism. This has accelerated political corruption, created culture wars, fomented distrust of others, and added to global political instability. The information revolution has influenced all of these: it has created its own dark geopolitical force through the explosion of social media and industrial disinformation undermining individual critical thinking and democratic processes. Law enforcement and public health agencies face the consequences of these dark forces in their daily work, but they also need to understand more and develop more effective partnership responses to counter the worst excesses of the new geopolitical realities.

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