The End-Relational Theory of ‘Ought’ and the Weight of Reasons

Abstract

Stephen Finlay analyses 'ought' in terms of probability. According to him, normative 'ought's are statements about the likelihood that an act will realize some (contextually supplied) end. I raise a problem for this theory. It concerns the relation between 'ought' and the balance of reasons. 'A ought to F' seems to entail that the balance of reasons favours that A F-es, and vice versa. Given Finlay's semantics for 'ought', it also makes sense to think of reasons and their weight in terms of probability. In this paper, I develop such a theory of weight. It turns out, however, that it cannot explain the entailments. This leaves Finlay with a challenge: to explain these entailments in some other way consistent with his theory, or to show why the appearances deceive and there are no such entailments.

Weight for Stephen Finlay

“…So we’ll have to assume that the context will always supply an appropriate set of background assumptions, via a principle of accommodation (thanks to Ralph Wedgwood). See also my (2010). …”

A “Good” Explanation of Five Puzzles about Reasons

“…Versions of this problem have been raised by Daan Evers (2010: 412) and Mike Ridge (correspondence); my treatment in this paper expands on Finlay 2014: 94n.…”

“…88I won't explore the mass noun constructions, “some/more/most reason ” here; see Evers 2010, Finlay 2014: 91f, Wedgwood 2015, Fogal 2016.…”

“…99Evers 2010, Finlay 2014: 92, Wedgwood ms. Compare Maguire's (2016) suggestion that reasons’ weight is a function of goodness and probability; cf.…”

“…For example, that doing A would be good for my children's welfare is an explanation why doing A would be good for ends I care about ; cf. Evers 2010: 412.…”