The effects of cap-and-trade regulation and sales effort on supply chain coordination

Xu, Xiaoping; Yang, Yuanyuan; Ji, Ting

doi:10.1007/s10479-023-05220-w

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 47 publications

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“…In the context of carbon cap-and-trade policy, Xu et al investigated the optimal production decision and sales effort level under cost-sharing and quantity discount contracts. They explored the impact of supervision and sales work on supply chain coordination [62].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Retailer-Led Low-Carbon Supply Chain Coordination Considering Sales Effort

Zhang

Ding

2023

Sustainability

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This paper develops a Stackelberg game model for a retailer-led secondary low-carbon supply chain (L-CSC) comprising a manufacturer and a retailer. Then, a two-part pricing contract is designed to investigate the product pricing, carbon reduction, and sales effort decision problems, and relevant management insights are obtained through numerical analysis. The study shows an efficiency loss in decentralized decision making compared to centralized decision making. Considering the sales effort improves the efficiency of the supply chain, retail price, carbon emission reduction (CER), sales effort level, and supply chain profit positively relate to product low carbon preference and sales sensitivity coefficients. The designed two-part pricing contract can increase the profit of the entire L-CSC and optimize the decision level under centralized decision making.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%