The effect of investor protection on forced CEO turnover
Gabriele D’Alauro,
Alberto Quagli,
Mario Nicoliello
Abstract:Purpose
This paper aims to analyze the direct and indirect effects of investor protection on forced CEO turnover.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors investigate 5,175 firm-year observations from 16 European countries over 2012–2018, collect data on four national investor protection indicators, identify 196 forced CEO turnovers and use multiple logistic regression models.
Findings
The results show that a reduction in the degree of investor protection significantly increases the probability of a forced … Show more
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