1996
DOI: 10.1002/(sici)1099-0771(199612)9:4<265::aid-bdm231>3.0.co;2-4
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The Effect of Decision Strategy on Deciding to Defer Choice
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1997
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Cited by 139 publications
(92 citation statements)
References 31 publications
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“…Accordingly, participants were more likely to join groups after negative versus positive outcomes and were sensitive to the amount of experienced outcomes. These results are consistent with previous studies on delegation showing that people prefer to give up autonomy when faced with difficult choices, choices they might regret, or decisions with high risk of error [5,10,[15][16][17][18].…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 91%
“…Accordingly, participants were more likely to join groups after negative versus positive outcomes and were sensitive to the amount of experienced outcomes. These results are consistent with previous studies on delegation showing that people prefer to give up autonomy when faced with difficult choices, choices they might regret, or decisions with high risk of error [5,10,[15][16][17][18].…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 91%
“…Spranca et al's (1991) explanation for the pattern of judgments was in line with general judgment effects such as omission bias (Sugarman, 1989), and regret (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982) in which the expectancy of bringing about an outcome through action rather than inaction is treated as more causally influential. Moreover, the same judgment pattern is in line with general preferences for, and favorable judgments of inaction over action in judgment and decision-making literature, variably referred to as: status quo bias (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988), omission bias (Ritov & Baron, 1992), inaction inertia (Tykocinski, Pittman, & Tuttle, 1995), and choice deferral (Dhar, 1996, for review, see Anderson, 2003). Cushman and Young (2011) were able to show that peoples' moral judgments and causal attributions are sensitive to factors such as commission/omission along similar lines to Spranca et al's (1991) study.…”
Section: Evidence For Domain-general Inputs In Moral Contextssupporting
confidence: 76%
“…In contrast, satisficers perform an alternative-based strategy that involves evaluating options one by one against all criteria before moving on to evaluating the next alternative (Bettman & Zins, 1979;Dhar, 1996). This supports the relation between alternative-based evaluation and satisficing decision strategy (Dhar, 1996;Lindberg et al, 1989). Maximizers carry out a thorough review and refinement step by checking whether the process has been comprehensive and all suitable alternatives are assessed.…”
Section: General Differences Between Maximizers and Satisficersmentioning
confidence: 61%
“…The dominant evaluation strategy for maximizers is attribute-based evaluation, which involves the comparison of all alternatives for each attribute in turn (Bettman & Zins, 1979). In contrast, satisficers perform an alternative-based strategy that involves evaluating options one by one against all criteria before moving on to evaluating the next alternative (Bettman & Zins, 1979;Dhar, 1996). This supports the relation between alternative-based evaluation and satisficing decision strategy (Dhar, 1996;Lindberg et al, 1989).…”
Section: General Differences Between Maximizers and Satisficersmentioning
confidence: 64%
