2023
DOI: 10.1007/s11356-023-27001-5
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The drivers of carbon emissions in China: the perspective of fiscal decentralization

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Cited by 5 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…Moreover, some scholars contended directly that fiscal decentralization would increase carbon dioxide emissions. For example, Wu et al (2023) contended that local government intervention, despite its promotion of economic scale, fails to effectively enhance the economy's quality and could potentially result in retrogressive outcomes, including increased carbon emissions. In summary, scholars have no consensus regarding fiscal decentralization's effect on carbon emissions.…”
Section: Research On the Effect Of Fiscal Decentralization On Regiona...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Moreover, some scholars contended directly that fiscal decentralization would increase carbon dioxide emissions. For example, Wu et al (2023) contended that local government intervention, despite its promotion of economic scale, fails to effectively enhance the economy's quality and could potentially result in retrogressive outcomes, including increased carbon emissions. In summary, scholars have no consensus regarding fiscal decentralization's effect on carbon emissions.…”
Section: Research On the Effect Of Fiscal Decentralization On Regiona...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In conclusion, under the dual influence of fiscal revenue and economic growth incentives, Chinese local governments are no longer just providers of local public services; they are now the leaders and direct beneficiaries of local economic development [17][18][19][20]. Due to the strategy choice of local governments to provide industrial land at low prices for industrial takeover, under the effects of demonstration and incentive effects, this land supply strategy will inevitably affect the land supply behavior choices of neighboring local governments, turning land supply behavior into a game process among local governments.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%