The Doubting System 1: Evidence for automatic substitution sensitivity

Johnson, Eric; Tubau, Elisabet; Neys, Wim De

doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2015.12.008

Cited by 101 publications

(106 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…In present study, the liking rating task required participants to rate their feeling relying on their intuition, and the correlation between the liking rating and rationality score, which relates with participants’ cognitive ability and engaging deliberate thought, was relatively low. However, present experiments did not engage cognitive load and did not use more implicit measures such as response latency and autonomic responses, which were often applied in the intuitive logic studies [45, 46]. Therefore, it is possible that explicit and deliberate reasoning processes affected the present results.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 96%

People Like Logical Truth: Testing the Intuitive Detection of Logical Value in Basic Propositions

Nakamura

Kawaguchi

2016

PLoS ONE

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Recent studies on logical reasoning have suggested that people are intuitively aware of the logical validity of syllogisms or that they intuitively detect conflict between heuristic responses and logical norms via slight changes in their feelings. According to logical intuition studies, logically valid or heuristic logic no-conflict reasoning is fluently processed and induces positive feelings without conscious awareness. One criticism states that such effects of logicality disappear when confounding factors such as the content of syllogisms are controlled. The present study used abstract propositions and tested whether people intuitively detect logical value. Experiment 1 presented four logical propositions (conjunctive, biconditional, conditional, and material implications) regarding a target case and asked the participants to rate the extent to which they liked the statement. Experiment 2 tested the effects of matching bias, as well as intuitive logic, on the reasoners’ feelings by manipulating whether the antecedent or consequent (or both) of the conditional was affirmed or negated. The results showed that both logicality and matching bias affected the reasoners’ feelings, and people preferred logically true targets over logically false ones for all forms of propositions. These results suggest that people intuitively detect what is true from what is false during abstract reasoning. Additionally, a Bayesian mixed model meta-analysis of conditionals indicated that people’s intuitive interpretation of the conditional “if p then q” fits better with the conditional probability, q given p.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 96%

People Like Logical Truth: Testing the Intuitive Detection of Logical Value in Basic Propositions

Nakamura

Kawaguchi

2016

PLoS ONE

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“…After each response, we asked the participants to indicate how confident they were that their response was correct on a scale from 1 (guess) to 3 (certain). We also analyzed confidence ratings2 as they have been shown to reflect conflict, thus potentially providing converging evidence for the accuracy and response time data (Johnson, Tubau, & De Neys, 2016). There were 16 practice trials with feedback (not analyzed), and 64 experimental trials (presented in a randomized order for each participant).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

When fast logic meets slow belief: Evidence for a parallel-processing model of belief bias

2016

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Two experiments pitted the default-interventionist account of belief bias against a parallel-processing model. According to the former, belief bias occurs because a fast, belief-based evaluation of the conclusion pre-empts a working-memory demanding logical analysis. In contrast, according to the latter both belief-based and logic-based responding occur in parallel. Participants were given deductive reasoning problems of variable complexity and instructed to decide whether the conclusion was valid on half the trials or to decide whether the conclusion was believable on the other half. When belief and logic conflict, the default-interventionist view predicts that it should take less time to respond on the basis of belief than logic, and that the believability of a conclusion should interfere with judgments of validity, but not the reverse. The parallel-processing view predicts that beliefs should interfere with logic judgments only if the processing required to evaluate the logical structure exceeds that required to evaluate the knowledge necessary to make a belief-based judgment, and vice versa otherwise. Consistent with this latter view, for the simplest reasoning problems (modus ponens), judgments of belief resulted in lower accuracy than judgments of validity, and believability interfered more with judgments of validity than the converse. For problems of moderate complexity (modus tollens and single-model syllogisms), the interference was symmetrical, in that validity interfered with belief judgments to the same degree that believability interfered with validity judgments. For the most complex (three-term multiple-model syllogisms), conclusion believability interfered more with judgments of validity than vice versa, in spite of the significant interference from conclusion validity on judgments of belief.Electronic supplementary materialThe online version of this article (doi:10.3758/s13421-016-0680-1) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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“…For example, reasoners who answer intuitively to conflict problems need more time (Bonner & Newell, 2010; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Pennycook, Trippas, Handley, & Thompson, 2014; Villejoubert, 2009; Stupple, Ball, Evans, & Kamal-Smith, 2011), are less confident about their response (Bago & De Neys, 2017; De Neys, Cromheeke, & Osman, 2011; Gangemi, Bourgeois-Gironde, & Mancini, 2015; Johnson, Tubau, & De Neys, 2016; Thompson & Johnson, 2014) and show increased activation of brain areas assumed to mediate conflict and error monitoring (De Neys, Vartanian, & Goel, 2008; Simon, Lubin, Houdé, & De Neys, 2015) compared to when they give the normative answer to the no-conflict ones. These studies thus provide basic evidence for the presence of conflict detection in biased reasoners.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conflict Detection and Logical Complexity

Schaeken¹,

Markovits²,

Neys

2018

PSYCHOL BELG

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Empirical evidence for the capacity to detect conflict between biased reasoning and normative principles has led to the proposal that reasoners have an intuitive grasp of some basic logical principles. In two studies, we investigate the boundary conditions of these logical intuitions by manipulating the logical complexity of problems where logical validity and conclusion believability conflict or not. Results pointed to evidence for successful conflict detection on the basic Modus Ponens (MP) inference, but also showed evidence for such a phenomenon on the more complex Modus Tollens (MT) inference. This suggests that both the MP and the MT inferences are simple enough for reasoners to have an intuitive grasp of their logical structure. The boundaries of logical intuition might thus reside in problems of greater complexity than these inferences. We also observed that on the invalid Affirmation of the Consequent (AC) and Denial of the Antecedent (DA) inferences, participants showed higher accuracy on the inference that was expected to be more complex (DA), and no evidence for successful conflict detection was found on these forms. Implications for the logical intuition framework are discussed.

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The Doubting System 1: Evidence for automatic substitution sensitivity

Cited by 101 publications

References 45 publications

People Like Logical Truth: Testing the Intuitive Detection of Logical Value in Basic Propositions

People Like Logical Truth: Testing the Intuitive Detection of Logical Value in Basic Propositions

When fast logic meets slow belief: Evidence for a parallel-processing model of belief bias

Conflict Detection and Logical Complexity

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