The development of reasoning with causal conditionals.

Janveau-Brennan, Geneviève; Markovits, Henry

doi:10.1037/0012-1649.35.4.904

Cited by 97 publications

(105 citation statements)

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“…Both Klaczynski's and Verschueren's dual-process theories agree that producing indeterminate inferences on the AC and DA forms rely on analytic processes. Actually, there is abundant evidence that the production of these indeterminate inferences increases with age from childhood to adulthood, strongly suggesting that, more often than children, adults rely on analytic processes when reasoning from conditional statements (Barrouillet et al, 2000;Barrouillet et al, 2001;De Neys & Everaerts, 2008;Ennis, 1976;Jenveau-Brennan & Markovits, 1999;Markovits, Fleury, Quinn, & Venet, 1998;O'Brien & Overton, 1982).…”

Section: Relationships With Other Dual-process Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Heuristic and analytic processes in mental models for conditionals: An integrative developmental theory

Gauffroy

Barrouillet

2009

Developmental Review

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a b s t r a c tThis article presents a developmental dual-process theory of the understanding of conditionals that integrates Evans' heuristic-analytic theory within the revised mental model theory of conditional proposed by Barrouillet, Gauffroy, and Lecas (2008). According to this theory, the interpretation of a conditional sentence is driven by unconscious and implicit heuristic processes that provide individuals with an initial representation that captures its meaning by representing the cases that make it true. This initial model can be enriched with additional models (a process named fleshing out within the mental model theory) through the intervention of conscious and demanding analytic processes. Being optional, these processes construct representations of cases that are only compatible with the conditional, leaving its truth-value indeterminate when they occur. Because heuristic processes are relatively immune to developmental changes, while analytic processes strongly develop with age, the initial model remains stable through development whereas the number of additional models that can be constructed increases steadily. Thus, the dual-process mental model theory predicts in which cases conditionals will be deemed true, indeterminate, or false and how these cases evolve with age. These predictions were verified in children, adolescents and adults who were asked to evaluate the truth value and the probability of several types of conditionals. The results reveal a variety of developmental trajectories in the way different conditionals are interpreted, which can all be accounted for by our revised mental model theory.

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Section: Relationships With Other Dual-process Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Heuristic and analytic processes in mental models for conditionals: An integrative developmental theory

Gauffroy

Barrouillet

2009

Developmental Review

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“…A great deal of research has examined the kinds of inferences that are made under standard deductive instructions, which require a dichotomous evaluation of the certainty of a putative conclusion. Studies in which both children and adults have been looked at (e.g., Cummins, 1995;Janveau-Brennan & Markovits, 1999;Thompson, 1994Thompson, , 2000 have consistently shown a great deal of variation, due to both content and context, in this kind of reasoning. At least two kinds of processes have been posited to exp plain the observed variation.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…Several studies have shown that the relative number of alternative antecedents that can be readily accessed for any given if-f f then premise with familiar content will affect the kinds of inferences that are made to the AC (and DA) forms (Bucci, 1978;Cummins, 1995;Cummins, Lubart, Alksnis, & Rist, 1991;Janveau-Brennan & Markovits, 1999;Markovits & Vachon, 1990;Thompson, 1994Thompson, , 2000. For example, take the following AC inference: If a brick is thrown at a window, then the window will break.…”

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“…Developmental change is characterized mainly by a decrease in the rate of accepting the AC and DA inferences (e.g., JanveauBrennan & Markovits, 1999;Markovits & Vachon, 1990;O'Brien & Overton, 1980). There are some less clear-cut patterns that suggest possible developmental trends toward refusing the MP and MT inferences, at least in some cases (e.g., Janveau-Brennan & Markovits, 1999;O'Brien & Overton, 1980;Rumain, Connell, & Braine, 1983), but these are inconsistent and more difficult to interpret. The refer to these types of inferences as categorical, since they result in a binary response.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…There are, in fact, some recent results that are consistent with the idea that cognitive development in adolescence can be understood by the interplay between an early-developing associative system and a later developing analytic system (e.g., Klaczynski, 2001;Kokis, Macpherson, Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2002). More specifically, developmental studies in which children's conditional reasoning with familiar premises under standard deductive instructions has been looked at have suggested that children's ability to use an explicit counterexample to deny the AC inference is very limited at 6 or 7 years of age and undergoes rapid change subsequently (Janveau-Brennan & Markovits, 1999;Markovits, 2000). Although there are no known direct studies of probabilissured by the quantity and speed of retrieval of information from long-term memory) and responding to the AC (and DA) forms in both children (Janveau-Brennan & Markovits, 1999) and adults and also have shown differential latencies for AC inferences made with premises of differing degrees of associative strength (Grosset, Barrouillet, & Markovits, 2005).…”

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Different developmental patterns of simple deductive and probabilistic inferential reasoning

Markovits

Thompson

2008

Memory & Cognition

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dIn three studies, we examined simple counterexample-based and probabilistic reasoning in children 6, 7, and 9 years of age. In the first study, participants were asked to make conditional (if-f f then) inferences under both categorical (certain or uncertain) and probabilistic instructions. Results showed that 6-year-olds respond to both forms of inference in similar ways, but whereas probabilistic conditional inferences showed little development over this p period, categorical inferences clearly improved between 6 and 7 years of age. An analysis of the children's justifications indicated that performance under categorical instructions was strongly related to counterexample generation at all ages, whereas this was true only for the younger children for inferences under probabilistic instructions. These findings were replicated in a second study, using problems that referred to concrete stimuli with varying p probabilities of inference. A third study tested the hypothesis that children confused probability judgments with judgments of confidence and demonstrated a clear dissociation between these two constructs. Overall, these judgments of confidence and demonstrated a clear dissociation between these two constructs. Overall, these results show that children are capable of accurate conditional inferences under probabilistic instructions at a very t early age and that the differentiation between categorical and probabilistic conditional reasoning is clear by at least 9 years of age. These results are globally consistent with dual-process theories but suggest some difficulties for the way that the analytic-heuristic distinction underlying these theories has been conceptualized.

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Cognitive Development in Adolescence

Eccles

Wigfield

Byrnes

2003

Handbook of Psychology

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In this chapter, we focus on two major aspects of adolescent development: cognitive development and achievement/achievement motivation. First, we discuss cognitive development, pointing out the relevance of recent work for both learning and decision making. Most of the chapter focuses on achievement and achievement motivation. We summarize current patterns of school achievement and recent changes in both school completion and differential performance on standardized tests of achievement. Then we summarize both the positive and negative age‐related changes in school motivation and discuss how experiences in school might explain these developmental patterns. Finally, we discuss both gender and ethnic group differences in achievement motivation and link these differences to gender and ethnic group differences in academic achievement and longer‐term career aspirations.

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The development of reasoning with causal conditionals.

Cited by 97 publications

References 23 publications

Heuristic and analytic processes in mental models for conditionals: An integrative developmental theory

Heuristic and analytic processes in mental models for conditionals: An integrative developmental theory

Different developmental patterns of simple deductive and probabilistic inferential reasoning

Cognitive Development in Adolescence

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