The Determinants of U.S. Labor Disputes

Cramton, Peter; Tracy, Joseph

doi:10.1086/298355

Cited by 39 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…For ↵ > (1 + 2 )/(2(1 + )) 1/2, the SPE payoffs for player 1 and player 2 are equal to . 10 The data in Table 1 seem consistent with delays reported in Cramton and Tracy [14]. 11 De Bruyn and Bolton [2] have shown that the ERC model provides satisfactory fit for sequential bargaining game data along several dimensions (first-offer behavior, rejection behavior, disadvantageous counteroffers, ...) and that the estimates of fairness preferences obtained in one bargaining situation are indicative of bargainer behavior in other situations where strategic parameters such as time cost, stake and bargaining length differ.…”

Section: Concluding Discussionsupporting

confidence: 78%

Relative Concerns and Delays in Bargaining with Private Information

Mauleón

Vannetelbosch

2013

Games

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Abstract:We consider Rubinstein's two-person alternating-offer bargaining model with two-sided incomplete information. We investigate the effects of one party having relative concerns about the bargaining outcome and the delay in reaching an agreement. We find that facing an opponent with stronger relative concerns only hurts the bargainer when she is stronger than her opponent. In addition, we show that an increase of one party's relative concerns will decrease the maximum delay in reaching an agreement.

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Section: Concluding Discussionsupporting

confidence: 78%

Relative Concerns and Delays in Bargaining with Private Information

Mauleón

Vannetelbosch

2013

Games

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“…For example, economic research has historically examined issues such as strike incidence and duration (Campolieti, Hebdon and Hyatt, 2005), the determinants of strikes (Cramton and Tracy, 1994), and the impact of strikes on employment (Rao, 2000).…”

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confidence: 99%

An Assessment of Worker Reaction to their Union and Employer Post-Strike

Chaulk

Brown

2008

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Union members (n = 187) completed surveys assessing five affective measures (organizational commitment, job satisfaction, work climate satisfaction, management satisfaction, and union commitment) following a five-month long strike. Paired t-tests (using retrospective questions where participants assessed pre and post-strike affect on a single survey) found that the strike had a negative impact on worker reactions to both their management group and their union across all five measures. The significance of this study is that the negative effects of strikes can, and do, carry over into the workplace in terms of worker affect towards their union and employer. From a theoretical perspective, these findings are consistent with the IR systems’ concept of a feedback loop and suggest that future strike research and theories should be expanded to examine issues related to worker reaction.

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“…Using higher levels of unemployment to proxy higher worker strike costs, Ingram, Metcalf and Wadsworth (1993) find British strikes to be more likely the higher the unemployment, again contrary to expectations. On the other hand, Crampton and Tracy (1994) find that U.S. strike incidence increases with lower levels of unemployment and lower real wages. Burlow and Buckley (1998) offer empirical support for the joint costs model using Irish firm-level data, as does Nicolitsas (2000) using British data.…”

Section: I2 Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 89%

How Asymmetrically Increasing Joint Strike Costs Need Not Lead to Fewer Strikes

Pantsios

Polachek

2017

Atl Econ J

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in How Asymmetrically Increasing Joint Strike Costs Need Not Lead to Fewer Strikes APrIl 2017Any opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in this series may include views on policy, but IZA takes no institutional policy positions. The IZA research network is committed to the IZA Guiding Principles of Research Integrity. The IZA Institute of Labor Economics is an independent economic research institute that conducts research in labor economics and offers evidence-based policy advice on labor market issues. Supported by the Deutsche Post Foundation, IZA runs the world's largest network of economists, whose research aims to provide answers to the global labor market challenges of our time. Our key objective is to build bridges between academic research, policymakers and society. IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author. How Asymmetrically Increasing Joint Strike Costs Need Not Lead to Fewer Strikes *The "joint costs" model states that the incentive to strike is inversely related to the total costs associated with workers' and firms' strike activities. Not only has this model been tested with mixed results, but also the joint costs model is problematic in explaining several stylized facts in the strike literature because higher strike costs do not always yield a lower incidence of strike activity. This paper illustrates how the joint cost model can yield these counterintuitive results. It shows that strike incidence need not decrease when joint strike costs increase. The innovation is to raise union and firm joint strike costs in an asymmetric way. Increasing a particular side's strike costs necessarily decreases its incentive to strike.However, in response, the other side's incentive can increase, since under a number of circumstances it holds out with a higher probability in order to collect the relatively larger expected rents coming about because the other side's implicit threat point decreases. To illustrate this, we model contract negotiations as a simple one-period game. (No need for more complex repeated games such as attrition since our point is only to show as simply as possible why the joint-costs model yields ambiguous results.) We use standard Hicksian concession curves to der...

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The Determinants of U.S. Labor Disputes

Cited by 39 publications

References 13 publications

Relative Concerns and Delays in Bargaining with Private Information

Relative Concerns and Delays in Bargaining with Private Information

An Assessment of Worker Reaction to their Union and Employer Post-Strike

How Asymmetrically Increasing Joint Strike Costs Need Not Lead to Fewer Strikes

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