The vast majority of work in machine vision emphasizes the representation of perceived objects and events: it is these internal representations that incorporate the`knowledge' in knowledge-based vision or form thè models' in model-based vision. In this paper, we discuss simple machine vision systems developed by arti¢cial evolution rather than traditional engineering design techniques, and note that the task of identifying internal representations within such systems is made di¤cult by the lack of an operational de¢nition of representation at the causal mechanistic level. Consequently, we question the nature and indeed the existence of representations posited to be used within natural vision systems (i.e. animals). We conclude that representations argued for on a priori grounds by external observers of a particular vision system may well be illusory, and are at best place-holders for yet-to-be-identi¢ed causal mechanistic interactions. That is, applying the knowledge-based vision approach in the understanding of evolved systems (machines or animals) may well lead to theories and models that are internally consistent, computationally plausible, and entirely wrong.
I N T RO DUC T IONThe vast majority of work in machine vision emphasizes the representation of perceived objects and events: it is these internal representations that are thè knowledge' in knowledge-based vision and thè models' in model-based vision. In this paper, we argue that such notions of representation may have little use in explaining the operation of simple machine vision systems that have been developed by arti¢cial evolution rather than through traditional engineering design techniques, and which are, therefore, of questionable value in furthering our understanding of vision in animals, which are also the product of evolutionary processes. This is not to say that representations do not exist or are not useful: there are many potential applications of machine vision, of practical engineering importance, where signi¢cant problems are alleviated or avoided altogether by use of appropriate structured representations. Examples include medical imaging, terrain mapping, and tra¤c monitoring (e.g. Taylor et al. 1986;Sullivan 1992).But the success of these engineering endeavours may encourage us to assume that similar representations are of use in explaining vision in animals. In this paper, we argue that such assumptions may be misleading. Yet the assumption that vision is fundamentally dependent on representations (and further assumptions involving the nature of those representations) is widespread. We seek only to highlight problems with these assumptions; problems which appear to stem from incautious use of the notion of`representation'. We argue in particular that the notion of representation as the construction of an internal model representing some external situation is probably not applicable to evolved systems. This paper is intentionally provocative; the arguments put forward below are o¡ered for discussion, rather than as unquestionable tru...