The Contingencies of Societal Accountability: Examining the Link Between Civil Society and Good Government

Grimes, Marcia

doi:10.1007/s12116-012-9126-3

Cited by 59 publications

(54 citation statements)

References 49 publications

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“…For example, introduction of dejure multiparty elections lead African countries toward strengthening diagonal accountability (Lindberg 2006) perhaps because repeated participation in elections shape citizens to demand more democratic procedures and broader participation (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009, p. 415). At the same time, political competition and a minimum level of press freedom enables civil society to push for better quality of government (Grimes 2013). If elections prompt various actors to believe that democracy is Bthe new game in town^incentives to adhere to democratic norms increase (Lindberg 2009, p. 335), including holding the government to account.…”

Section: The Cost Of Suppressing the Demand For Accountabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Accountability Sequence: from De-Jure to De-Facto Constraints on Governments

2018

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Accountability is one of the cornerstones of good governance. Establishing accountable governments is a top priority on the international development agenda. Yet, scholars and democracy practitioners know little about how accountability mechanisms develop and thus can be supported by international and national actors. The present study tackles the questions of how, and in what sequence accountability sub-types develop. We consider not only vertical (elections and political parties) and horizontal accountability (legislature, judiciary, and other oversight bodies) but also diagonal accountability (civil society and media) in both their de-jure and the de-facto dimensions. By utilizing novel sequencing methods, we study their sequential relationships in 173 countries from 1900 to the present with data from the new V-Dem dataset. Considering the long-term dimensions of institution building, this study indicates that most aspects of de-facto vertical accountability precede other forms of accountability. Effective institutions of horizontal accountability-such as vigorous parliaments and independent high courts-evolve rather late in the sequence and build on progress in many other areas.Keywords Accountability . Sequencing . Democratization . Government oversight . De-facto power Political accountability is both one of the cornerstones of good governance and a key topic in academia. This power of the people to hold political leaders to account is fundamental to representative democracy, hence a key feature of most definitions of democracy (e.g., Dahl 1971Dahl , 1989Schmitter and Karl 1991). It is also a top priority on St Comp Int Dev (2019) 54:40-70 https://doi.org/10.1007 Authors contributed equally and are listed in reverse alphabetical order. * Valeriya MechkovaValeriya.mechkova@gu.se 1 V-Dem Institute, Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden the international development agenda, e.g., as a target of the Sustainable Development Goals (UN Resolution: A/Res/70/1). Yet, we know little about how and in what sequence different aspects of accountability evolve. The extant literature provides some suggestions on the sequence of democratization-thus how accountability starts to evolve. Dahl (1971) famously argued that it is conducive if competition among elites evolves before the expansion of participation, and there is some empirical support for this (Wilson 2015, p. 234). And while there are contributions on how one aspect of accountability may strengthen other aspects (e.g., Keane 2009), this study is the first of its kind by investigating if there are generalizable sequences in the evolution of accountability across 35 highly specific institutions with data covering 176 countries and 113 years.Taking Dahl's (1971) famous axiom as a point of departure, we argue that governments are more likely to allow for de-facto accountability if the costs of supplying accountability decrease and the costs of suppressing the demand for accountability increase. Distinguishing between i...

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Section: The Cost Of Suppressing the Demand For Accountabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Accountability Sequence: from De-Jure to De-Facto Constraints on Governments

2018

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“…However, research suggests that transparency only leads to an increase in accountability in certain conditions, where the broader ecosystem of institutions supports rule following [42,43]. The role of civil society in scrutinising conduct is, moreover, conditional on the existence of political freedoms as well as on capacity, two areas in which civil society organisations are often constrained [44,45]. Moreover, empirical evidence on voluntary programs suggests that clubs with weak monitoring systems are not very effective in eliciting responsible behavior.…”

Section: Monitoring and Enforcementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Business unusual: collective action against bribery in international business

Dávid-Barrett

2017

Crime Law Soc Change

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Collective action initiatives in which governments and companies make anticorruption commitments have proliferated in recent years. This apparently prosocial behavior defies the logic of collective action and, given that bribery often goes undetected and unpunished, is not easily explained by principal-agent theory. Club theory suggests that the answer lies in the institutional design of anti-corruption clubs: collective action can work as long as membership has high entry costs, members receive selective benefits, and compliance is adequately policed. This article contributes to the debate by examining how these conditions manifest in the case of anti-corruption clubs in the realm of international business, with particular focus on the international dimension of many initiatives. This vertical aspect of institutional design creates a richer, more complex set of reputational and material benefits for members, as well as allowing for more credible and consistent monitoring and enforcement.

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“…This includes holding the government to account. At the same time, political competition and a minimum level of press freedom enables civil society to push for better quality of government (Grimes 2013). …”

Section: (2) the Cost Of Suppressing The Demand For Accountabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Accountability Sequence: From De-jure to De-facto Constraints on Governments

2017

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The Contingencies of Societal Accountability: Examining the Link Between Civil Society and Good Government

Cited by 59 publications

References 49 publications

The Accountability Sequence: from De-Jure to De-Facto Constraints on Governments

The Accountability Sequence: from De-Jure to De-Facto Constraints on Governments

Business unusual: collective action against bribery in international business

The Accountability Sequence: From De-jure to De-facto Constraints on Governments

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