The ‘conjunction fallacy’ revisited: how intelligent inferences look like reasoning errors

Bayesian reasoning without numbers: Are proportions more natural than probabilities?

“…Our finding could be viewed from the rather foundational perspective of ecological rationality, which emphasizes the role of the fit between the structure of the environment and the design of the mind (for Bayesian reasoning, e.g., Brase & Hill, 2015). It also fits the interpretation of Hertwig and Wulff (2022) of the discrepancies between human capacities depending on whether the situation is presented in terms of either closer to symbolic description (in our case, the more abstract concept of single-case probability) or immediately perceivable experience (in our case, the concept of proportion as part-whole ratio).…”

Is there a “People are Stupid” school in social psychology?

“…The ancient Romans said errare humanum est. Moreover, variations in the framing of a problem may affect the error rate (Hertwig & Gigerenzer 1999). We agree with Krueger & Funder (henceforth K&F) that this perspective has been lost in research on judgmental biases, and we suggest that neglect of individual differences constitutes part of the problem.…”

Use and communication of probabilistic forecasts

“…1 time in 10). It has been argued that uncertainty presented as frequency is easier for people to understand (Fiedler, 1988;Hertwig and Gigerenzer, 1999). However, found that people better understood the forecast when it was presented in probability format rather than a frequency format, in contrast with the earlier research.…”