The communication and computation cost of wireless security

Singelée, Dave; Seys, Stefaan; Batina, Lejla; Verbauwhede, Ingrid

doi:10.1145/1998412.1998414

Cited by 19 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…The former indicates the cost of performing cryptographic operations while the latter refers to the cost of transmitting/receiving bits to/from a device. However, several papers have shown that the computation cost is often negligible compared to the communication cost [28,37]. Thus, we propose to use a new optimized message format that is slightly different from the original message format (see Fig.…”

Section: Secure Data Exchangementioning

confidence: 99%

Securing Wireless Neurostimulators

Marin

Singelée

Yang

et al. 2018

Proceedings of the Eighth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy

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Implantable medical devices (IMDs) typically rely on proprietary protocols to wirelessly communicate with external device programmers. In this paper, we fully reverse engineer the proprietary protocol between a device programmer and a widely used commercial neurostimulator from one of the leading IMD manufacturers. For the reverse engineering, we follow a black-box approach and use inexpensive hardware equipment. We document the message format and the protocol state-machine, and show that the transmissions sent over the air are neither encrypted nor authenticated. Furthermore, we conduct several software radio-based attacks that could compromise the safety and privacy of patients, and investigate the feasibility of performing these attacks in real scenarios. Motivated by our findings, we propose a security architecture that allows for secure data exchange between the device programmer and the neurostimulator. It relies on using a patient's physiological signal for generating a symmetric key in the neurostimulator, and transporting this key from the neurostimulator to the device programmer through a secret out-of-band (OOB) channel. Our solution allows the device programmer and the neurostimulator to agree on a symmetric session key without these devices needing to share any prior secrets; offers an effective and practical balance between security and permissive access in emergencies; requires only minor hardware changes in the devices; adds minimal computation and communication overhead; and provides forward and backward security. Finally, we implement a proof-of-concept of our solution.

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Section: Secure Data Exchangementioning

confidence: 99%

Securing Wireless Neurostimulators

Marin

Singelée

Yang

et al. 2018

Proceedings of the Eighth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy

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“…Assuming a cost of 185nJ/bit for transmitting and 133nJ/bit for receiving [13], the modified EC-A requires approximately 31mJ for a pair wise secret key establishment and hence not energy efficient. In [14] we have proposed an efficient elliptic curve based key establishment technique for WSNs (hereinafter called ECKM) with reduced communication overhead and storage requirement.…”

Section: Algorithm 1 Modified Ec-a Algorithm For Key Establishmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hardware Implementation of an Efficient Key Management Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks

Jilna¹,

Deepthi²,

Jayaraj³

2016

IJICR

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“…ECDH consumes about 57 mJ on ATMEL MICAz architectures [46] considering both computational and communication overheads. The cost for COKE can be summarized by leveraging the transmission and reception per-bit-cost provided by [47]. In detail, assuming a cost of 185 nJ/bit for transmitting and 133 nJ/bit for receiving, COKE needs 17 mJ in order to establish a 96 bits secret key.…”

Section: Coke Energy Budgetmentioning

confidence: 99%