The ‘China model’ and the global crisis: from Friedrich List to a Chinese mode of governance?

Abstract

and the global political economy) and on and comparative regional governance. AbstractThe global financial crisis reinvigorated ongoing debates over whether China has its own distinct and separate "model" of political economy and/or development. There is much that connects this Chinese model with previous systems of national political economies; partly in terms of specific policy preferences, but also in terms of shared basic conceptions of the distribution of power in the global order. Like these previous systems, China has come to stand as an example of an alternative to following dominant (neo)liberal models of development. In this respect, what the China model is not and what China does not stand for might be more important than what itactually is and what it stands for. However, the idea of a coherent and unique Chinese model has considerable purchase, and is both informed and feeds into considerations of China's uniqueness and difference from the norms, ideas and philosophies that dominate in the rest of the world.

Second image revisited: The domestic sources of China’s foreign economic policies

“…Instead, it further develops a perspective which argues that China will seek to change existing global rules in favor of protecting the necessary 'developmental space' (Wade, 2003) for its own domestic model. In line with some recent research (Chin and Thakur, 2010;Breslin, 2011;Strange, 2011), our studies indicate that this alternative model has become a new variation of the 'developmental state' (Ten Brink and Nölke, 2013;Nölke, 2014). This development becomes even more likely when we take into account that other emerging markets such as India share similar features with regard to the prominent economic role of the state and may further facilitate to move the world into a similar direction (Dahlman, 2012).…”

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and Status-Seeking: China’s Foray into Global Economic Governance

“…In reality, China has emerged as the undisputed informal leader of emerging and developing countries in regional and multilateral fora, challenging the leadership of established powers in areas like climate action. Moreover, it has made headway in initiating new norms and rules in diplomacy, foreign policy and global governance (Chan 2013;Pu 2012;Yan 2013), and promoting its distinctive model of political economy and development (Breslin 2011). All these seem to validate the SIT theoretical prediction.…”

The Consequences of the global financial crisis: the rhetoric of reform and regulation

“…But what the China model actually might be is less important than what it is perceived to be-and it has largely come to be seen as an example of what you can do if you do it on your own terms rather than following the "Western way." So the China model has become a standard bearer for what it is not; it is not big bank shock therapy liberalization, it is not economic liberalization accompanied by political democratization, and it is not doing what the international liberal global order wants-for example, liberalizing financial sectors and allowing free-floating market exchange rates (Breslin, 2011).…”

“…But this should not mean that the rest of the world should be concerned by this power shift. China's developmental needs require access to markets and resources that would be made more difficult to attain if China was to destabilize international relations and/or antagonize key players; it is a responsible, dissatisfied, great power (Breslin, 2010). Ultimately, what is depicted (or more correctly, constructed) as China's historical and cultural predilection for peace and harmonies is promoted as being more appropriate for the promotion of global harmony than the existing "Western" system (Su, 2009).…”