Handbook of Experimental Phenomenology 2013
DOI: 10.1002/9781118329016.ch3
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Abstract: The chapter deals with the notion of phenomenal realness, which was first systematically explored by Albert Michotte. Phenomenal realness refers to the impression that a perceptual object is perceived to have an autonomous existence in our mind-independent world. Perceptual psychology provides an abundance of phenomena, ranging from amodal completion to picture perception, that indicate that phenomenal realness is an independent perceptual attribute that can be conferred to perceptual objects in different degr… Show more

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Cited by 11 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“…The immediate and almost visceral nature of the illusion is nicely demonstrated in the Amazing Johnathan’s brilliant performance of it. 4 Even before the trick starts, Johnathan starts yelling to the audience, “It’s a trick; it’s a trick.” Yet, the audience not only perceives that the knife penetrates the arm, they also experience it as utterly real (Leddington, 2016; Mausfeld, 2013; Michotte, 1991) and correspondingly repulsive.…”
Section: Experiencing Hidden Things: the Counterintuitive Phenomenon mentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…The immediate and almost visceral nature of the illusion is nicely demonstrated in the Amazing Johnathan’s brilliant performance of it. 4 Even before the trick starts, Johnathan starts yelling to the audience, “It’s a trick; it’s a trick.” Yet, the audience not only perceives that the knife penetrates the arm, they also experience it as utterly real (Leddington, 2016; Mausfeld, 2013; Michotte, 1991) and correspondingly repulsive.…”
Section: Experiencing Hidden Things: the Counterintuitive Phenomenon mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…On a more general level, we believe that analogous lines of reasoning may help to flesh out further the role of genuinely perceptual mechanisms in causing people to make inferences about causality (Duncker, 1945, pp. 66–67; Leslie, 1988; Michotte, 1954/1963; Ortiz, 2006, p. 54; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000), actions and intentions (Scholl & Gao, 2013; Van de Cruys, Wagemans, & Ekroll, 2015), or even “realness” (Leddington, 2016; Mausfeld, 2013; Michotte, 1991; Vishwanath, 2013, 2014). One could argue that it is the automatic nature of amodal perception that makes such a potent tool for creating robust and surprising magical effects.…”
Section: Cognitive Impenetrabilitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Rather, since the secret to the trick is hidden behind a misleading and persistent perceptual experience, realizing the true secret behind the trick is only possible via abstract logical thinking that questions the veracity of one's own immediate perceptual experience. Given that we (or our perceptual systems) have a strong penchant for imparting reality to our perceptual experiences (Hoffman, Singh, & Prakash, 2015; Jackendoff, 1991; Koenderink, 2011; Leddington, 2016; Mausfeld, 2013; Michotte, 1991; Savardi, Kubovy, & Bianchi, 2012; Vishwanath, 2013), this is not likely to happen very frequently.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Embodied and enactive approaches can be powerful methodological tools in behavioral and neurophysiological investigation, but their ultimate reliance on sensorimotor contingencies for the construction of mental content inevitably gives them a naïve realist flavor (see Vishwanath, 2005 ). These theories lack a categorial distinction among the levels of reality ( Poli, 2001 , 2006 ), the different degrees of perceived reality (reality being a perceptual attribute in phenomenological experience, see Metzger, 1941/1963 ; Michotte, 1957 ; Mausfeld, 2013 ), and the different explanations of facts according to their specific complexity. Sharing a widespread terminological ambiguity, the theories presented as a cognitive neuroscience of phenomenology tackle the issue of mind and consciousness in quantitative terms, i.e., in terms of stimuli and the elaboration of information contained within the stimuli, occasionally still referring to the classical conception of Shannon and Weaver (1949/1998 ).…”
Section: Categorial Misunderstandingsmentioning
confidence: 99%