The Administrative Board of Review of the European Central Bank: Experience After 2 Years

Morra, Concetta Brescia; Smits, R.; Magliari, Andrea

doi:10.1007/s40804-017-0081-3

Cited by 59 publications

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References 20 publications

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“…On December 2021, the ECB published a new Guide to fit and proper assessments, ECB ( 2021 ). Furthermore, the ECB has expressed the request that the current lack of uniformity in the verification of the FAP requirements be overcome by updating the CRD IV: indeed, ‘while the guide will help to make such assessments in a more harmonised manner, discrepancies are set to remain on account of the application of national laws’, ECB ( 2018c ), p 77; in the same sense, Brescia Morra et al ( 2017 ), p 585.…”

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confidence: 99%

Fit and Proper Requirements in the EU Banking Sector. A Step Further

Arrigoni

Rivolti

2022

Eur Bus Org Law Rev

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Prudential regulation has become increasingly important over time. In such a context, strict suitability requirements for members of the management body and key function holders are considered an adequate tool to safeguard the sound and prudent management of banks. In the years following the Great Financial Crisis in 2008–2009 and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis in 2010–2012, the regulatory and supervisory approach to banks’ corporate governance has seen a significant evolution. The centralisation of banking supervision at the Eurozone level was complemented by the application of a single rulebook throughout the European Union which stated, in compliance with the Capital Requirements Directive, higher suitability requirements for being appointed as a member of a management body or as a key function holder at a bank. Furthermore, the choice to identify fit and proper requirements through standards attributes significant power to the decision maker, thus allowing greater public control over private choices, and is justified by the need to prevent negative externalities. This approach is open to debate. Against the background of the pursuit of public interest, the lawmaker confers discretionary power on the supervisory authorities (the European Central Bank and the national competent authorities), and sets restrictions on the job market for board member candidates. This paper is a contribution enriching the ongoing discussion about the existing regulatory and policy regime, with a special focus on the specific functions performed by the management body members and particularly by the chairs of the management body’s special committees.

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confidence: 99%