Testimonial Injustice Without Credibility Deficit (or Excess)

Luzzi, Federico

doi:10.1002/tht3.212

Cited by 11 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…For an attempt to broaden Fricker's concept in a way that might better suit Murris' purposes, see Hookway (2010). 5 For an argument that it is not, based on very different considerations than I advance here, see Luzzi (2016).…”

Section: Orcidmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Children, credibility, and testimonial injustice

Bartlett

2021

Journal of Social Philosophy

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According to Miranda Fricker (2007), a person suffers testimonial injustice when they suffer a wrongful credibility deficit-that is, when their assertions are met with undue skepticism. Fricker holds that "[i]n face-to-face testimonial exchanges the hearer must make some attribution of credibility regarding the speaker" (18, orig. emphasis), and that a credibility deficit occurs if the attributed credibility is below the level suggested by the evidence of the speaker's veracity.Not every instance of credibility deficit is a testimonial injustice. Fricker discusses cases of credibility deficit resulting from innocent error or honest mistake (21-22; 33-34). A credibility deficit can also be justified if a speaker has a poor track record of truthfulness or accuracy, or if it is implausible (or impossible) that they have knowledge of what they are speaking about.However, Fricker is concerned with the kind of credibility deficit that follows a person across a wide range of contexts, and through years or decades of their life. This kind of persistent and systematic credibility deficit constitutes the most significant kind of testimonial injustice. It is usually based in a negative identity-prejudicial stereotype concerning the person's social identity. Fricker defines such a stereotype as:A widely held disparaging association between a social group and one or more attributes, where this association embodies a generalization that displays some (typically, epistemically culpable) resistance to counter-evidence owing to an ethically bad affective investment. (35) She focuses on the prejudices of racism and sexism. But clearly other aspects of identity can be the foci of prejudice, and thus of persistent and systematic testimonial injustice: such as ethnicity, class, nationality, disability, or age.Concerning the last of these, age, it is widely accepted that there is prejudice against the elderly. The term ageism was coined fifty years ago to denote such prejudice (Butler 1969). 1 As yet, there is no discussion of testimonial injustice against the elderly. There is, however, an emerging discussion of testimonial injustice against children. That is my interest here. Some recent authors claim that children

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Section: Orcidmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For an argument that it is not, based on very different considerations than I advance here, see Luzzi (2016).…”

mentioning

confidence: 95%

Children, credibility, and testimonial injustice

Bartlett

2021

Journal of Social Philosophy

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“…An employee with a healthcare or disability issue may either not be believed by epistemically unjust managers or doctors (testimonial), or find it difficult to explain, formulate, and secure reasonable adjustments (hermeneutic) (Kidd and Carel 2017). Women may report having their workplace testimonials or contributions ignored or 'mansplained' back to them in an epistemically unjust culture, where men are unfairly discrediting, then re-appropriating, their role as a credible knower (Luzzi 2016). In Obama's White House Oval Office, for example, women used a strategy of 'amplification' to collectively combat epistemic injustice and boost their credibility, by overtly recognizing and repeating one another's verbal contributions to strategy and policy discussions (Eilperin 2016).…”

Section: Epistemic Injusticementioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic Vices in Organizations: Knowledge, Truth, and Unethical Conduct

Baird

Calvard

2018

J Bus Ethics

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Recognizing that truth is socially constructed or that knowledge and power are related is hardly a novelty in the social sciences. In the twenty-first century, however, there appears to be a renewed concern regarding people's relationship with the truth and the propensity for certain actors to undermine it. Organizations are highly implicated in this, given their central roles in knowledge management and production and their attempts to learn, although the entanglement of these epistemological issues with business ethics has not been engaged as explicitly as it might be. Drawing on work from a virtue epistemology perspective, this paper outlines the idea of a set of epistemic vices permeating organizations, along with examples of unethical epistemic conduct by organizational actors. While existing organizational research has examined various epistemic virtues that make people and organizations effective and responsible epistemic agents, much less is known about the epistemic vices that make them ineffective and irresponsible ones. Accordingly, this paper introduces vice epistemology, a nascent but growing subfield of virtue epistemology which, to the best of our knowledge, has yet to be explicitly developed in terms of business ethics. The paper concludes by outlining a business ethics research agenda on epistemic vice, with implications for responding to epistemic vices and their illegitimacy in practice.

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“…See https://www.bbc.com/worklife/article /20180727-mansplaining-explained-in-one-chart and https://twitter.com /kimgoodwin/status/1020029572266438657 for the chart itself. 3 The exception is an extremely brief mention of the mechanics of mansplaining by Luzzi (2016). Academic but nonphilosophical works on mansplaining are Bridges (2017) and Lutzky and Lawson (2019).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mansplaining as Epistemic Injustice

Dular

2021

FPQ

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“Mansplaining” is by now part of the common cultural vernacular. Yet, academic analyses of it—specifically, philosophical ones—are missing. This paper sets out to address just that problem. Analyzed through a lens of epistemic injustice, the focus of the analysis concerns both what it is, and what its harms are. I argue it is a form of epistemic injustice distinct from testimonial injustice wherein there is a dysfunctional subversion of the epistemic roles of hearer and speaker in a testimonial exchange. As these are roles of power and are crucial to our existence and functioning within epistemic communities, the wrong and harms suffered from this injustice are serious and, I argue, distinct from other types already discussed in the literature. I close by considering an alternative model of mansplaining as a form of silencing, as well as briefly diagnosing its general underlying cause and possible solutions.

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Testimonial Injustice Without Credibility Deficit (or Excess)

Cited by 11 publications

References 3 publications

Children, credibility, and testimonial injustice

Children, credibility, and testimonial injustice

Epistemic Vices in Organizations: Knowledge, Truth, and Unethical Conduct

Mansplaining as Epistemic Injustice

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