Study on the effect of income perception on cleaner-production fraud

Abstract

We investigate a single-cycle product supply chain with one retailer and one supplier in a game model, where the supplier is the leader and the retailer is the follower. By innovatively introducing cleaner production fraudulent income perception factor into the game model, we studied the mechanism of the effect of enterprise social responsibility and environmental awareness on cleaner production fraud. The results showed that the value of cleaner production fraudulent income perception factor will affect the enterprise's choice of differentiation strategy. When the enterprise's sense of social responsibility is weak, i.e., the fraudulent income perception factor is correspondingly large, it more likely to choose cleaner production fraud. Conversely, under the constraints of high social responsibility, it more likely avoids production fraud. Regarding government supervision, a reasonable punishment for cleaner production fraud can reduce such violations to some extent. However, after the punishment reaches a level, the efficiency of supervision beginning to decline. In views of that, improving enterprise social responsibility through institutional reform is a more effective way to reduce cleaner production fraud. To contribute to a healthy competitive market environment, government supervision should establish a feedback mechanism, and make timely adjustments.

Precise Supervision of Enterprise Environmental Protection Behavior Based on Boolean Matrix Factorization under Low Carbon Background

“…[8][9][10][11][12][13]. The focus is on advocating enterprises to take the initiative to improve their behavior, as well as suggestions on measures for departmental supervision [14][15][16][17]. However, due to the great differences in the status quo of enterprises [18], it is difficult for departments to make use of limited manpower and resources to carry out reasonable supervision, resulting in an imbalance between the actual supervision measures of the departments and the improvement of enterprise pollution behaviors, and the effectiveness of supervising the environmental protection behavior of enterprises is low [19].…”