Standardization as Institutional Work: The Regulatory Power of a Responsible Investment Standard

Slager, Rieneke; Gond, Jean‐Pascal; Moon, Jeremy

doi:10.1177/0170840612443628

Cited by 205 publications

(247 citation statements)

References 55 publications

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“…Yet this literature has overlooked the research and findings from the literature on ratings/rankings [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8], which suggests that ratings/rankings in and of themselves could impact organizational behavior.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Combining insights from the research on ratings/rankings [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8] and a behavioral theory of the firm [9][10][11][12][13][14][15], we hypothesize that rated firms are more likely to enhance their subsequent CSR behavior, and hence performance ratings, when their negative CSR rating gaps-CSR ratings below the industry average-are large rather than small, while positive CSR rating gaps-CSR ratings above the industry average-are unlikely to change their subsequent behavior. We reason that this relationship arises because firms tend to seek to eschew being seen as CSR laggards compared with their industry rivals, thereby putting more efforts toward elevating their CSR performance.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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How Third-Party CSR Evaluation Matters: Keeping Up with Rivals in CSR Performance Ratings of Korean Firms, 2011–2015

Hyun

2017

Sustainability

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Does corporate social responsibility (CSR) evaluation by third-party entities (i.e., external agencies, including civic organizations) affect the CSR performance of firms? This article explores the question of whether and how third-party CSR ratings change the subsequent CSR behavior and hence performance of rated firms. Combining insights from the research on ratings/rankings and a behavioral theory of firms, we hypothesize that firms with large negative CSR rating gaps-i.e., CSR ratings below the industry average-are more prone to improving their subsequent CSR behavior, and hence performance ratings, than those with small negative gaps, because of the desire to avoid being viewed as CSR laggards relative to their industry rivals. As a result, efforts are directed at enhancing CSR performance. Empirical support for this conjecture is found through random effect regression analyses of publicly listed firms in Korea that were rated by the KEJI (Korean Economic Justice Institute) during 2011-2015 with respect to multiple dimensions of CSR. Further results show that the positive effect of negative CSR rating gaps on subsequent CSR ratings appears only in the firms without well-established reputations, suggesting the possibility that firms with weak reputations have stronger incentives to keep up with other industry incumbents in CSR performance ratings than their counterparts.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Third-Party CSR Evaluation Matters: Keeping Up with Rivals in CSR Performance Ratings of Korean Firms, 2011–2015

Hyun

2017

Sustainability

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“…For instance, firms cannot sign up to become part of ISO 26000 or the Global Reporting Initiative (although firms can register their reports). In contrast to the Dow Jones example (above), the FTSE4Good Index, while restricted to the pool of listed companies, evaluates all in this pool and listing is not based on application but on monitoring (Slager et al 2012). Ignoring membership as an organizational element can be advantageous, as it lowers entry barriers and hence can positively influence adoption rates.…”

Section: Csr Standardsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Since monitoring is a costly and time-consuming practice, this division of labor creates many advantages, as different organizers apply complementary organizational elements. However, some standards rely upon monitoring and the sanction of inclusion/exclusion, as in the case of the FTSE4Good which has neither membership nor hierarchy (Slager et al 2012). Monitoring and sanctioning are not necessarily bound together.…”

Section: Csr Standardsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Complete and Partial Organizing for Corporate Social Responsibility

2013

Self Cite

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This paper investigates different modes of organizing for corporate social responsibility (CSR). Based on insights from organization theory, we theorize two ways to organize for CSR. ''Complete'' organization for CSR happens within businesses and depends on the availability of certain organizational elements (e.g., membership, hierarchy, rules, monitoring, and sanctioning). By contrast, ''partial'' organization for CSR happens when organizers do not have direct access to all these organizational elements. We discuss partial organization for CSR by analyzing how standards and cross-sector partnerships make selective use of organizational elements. We maintain that an important feature of the increasing institutionalization of CSR-not only within businesses but also among nongovernmental, governmental, and professional actors-is the rise of partial forms of organization. We discuss the contributions to this Special Issue in the context of our theorization of complete/partial organization for CSR and outline avenues for further research.

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“…There are several issues concerning sustainability accounting reporting concerning both in concept and in practice. According to (Slager, Gond & Moon, 2012) there are three components to that comprise the regulatory power of a standard. The first is design which is the established set of common practices.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Issues in Sustainability Accounting Reporting

Muñoz¹,

Zhao²,

Yang³

2017

AFR

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In the U.S., sustainability accounting reporting is developing and becoming more prevalent in public companies. This paper reviews accounting literature and Dow 30 companies' websites, presents a comprehensive view of the landscape of sustainability accounting reporting, and identifies seven issues of the reporting frameworks of sustainability accounting, i.e., (1) definitions, (2) measurements and disclosures, (3) motivations, (4) compliance, (5) enforcement, (6) standardization, and (7) the ultimate effect on reliability and comparability.An archival analysis approach is used to summarize and compare Dow 30 sustainability accounting reporting frameworks and information disclosed in 2015 annual reports and websites. The most popular framework is the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) G4 Sustainability Reporting Guidelines. Some companies developed sustainability accounting reporting frameworks and others did not disclose any information regarding sustainability accounting reporting. Although the GRI framework is the most used, external assurance is present in only a few companies.

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Standardization as Institutional Work: The Regulatory Power of a Responsible Investment Standard

Cited by 205 publications

References 55 publications

How Third-Party CSR Evaluation Matters: Keeping Up with Rivals in CSR Performance Ratings of Korean Firms, 2011–2015

How Third-Party CSR Evaluation Matters: Keeping Up with Rivals in CSR Performance Ratings of Korean Firms, 2011–2015

Complete and Partial Organizing for Corporate Social Responsibility

Issues in Sustainability Accounting Reporting

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