Stakeholder games in the evolution and development of green buildings in China: Government-led perspective

Feng, Qun; Chen, Hong; Shi, Xuejun; Wei, Jia

doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2020.122895

Cited by 45 publications

(34 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…The simulation results show that, within a certain range, an increase in the amounts of subsidies targeted at enterprises can effectively increase the demand for GH and the profits of the enterprises, which are conducive to the expansion of GH scale. This is in line with He (2021) [ 39 ] and Feng (2020) [ 42 ]. However, the effect of direct or indirect subsidies does not increase equally with the increase in the subsidy level.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 80%

“…Qian (2015) studied how to increase developers’ willingness to build GH through policy incentives by analyzing the evolution of the game strategies of the government and developers [ 15 ]. Fan (2018) further studied the decision-making mechanisms of the government and developers in the dynamic game process and found that under the interaction between the government and developers, the price premium, the level and affordability of incentives are the key factors influencing the player’s decisions [ 42 ]. Feng (2020) developed an evolutionary game model between developers and consumers using government subsidies as a control factor and proposed that providing government subsidies to construction units can promote the development of green buildings [ 43 ].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

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How Do Government Policies Promote Green Housing Diffusion in China? A Complex Network Game Context

Cao

Zhao

Xing

2022

IJERPH

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To reduce energy consumption and environmental pollution in the construction industry, many countries have focused on the development of green housing (GH), which is a type of green building for residential use. In China, the local governments have introduced various incentive policies to encourage the development of GH; however, its scale is still small and unevenly distributed. This implies a necessity to optimize the policies that apply to the GH incentive. To promote GH diffusion, we built an evolutionary game model on a complex network to analyze the impacts of government policies on GH pricing and demand and the profits of real estate enterprises developing GH. By implementing simulations, we further explored the incentive effect and operational mechanism of the government policies. The results show that the subsidy policy, the preferential policy for GH, and the restriction policy for ordinary housing can effectively promote the diffusion of GH to 0.6752, 0.506, and 0.5137 respectively. Meanwhile, the incentive effect of the enterprise subsidy policy and GH preferential policy gradually decreases with the increase in policy strength. In terms of the demand side, the consumer subsidy policy could promote GH diffusion to 0.7097. If the subsidy is below 120 CNY/m2, the effect of the consumer subsidy policy is less powerful than that of the enterprises subsidy policy; conversely, the former is slightly more effective than the latter. The outcome of the study has managerial implications on governmental decision-making, especially on the strategy design of incentive policies for GH.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 80%

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Do Government Policies Promote Green Housing Diffusion in China? A Complex Network Game Context

Cao

Zhao

Xing

2022

IJERPH

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“…This study reveals how incentive mechanism design affects stakeholders' choices of GB levels in both tangible and intangible ways. Construction of green buildings cannot be excluded from government supervision as per Feng et al in (2020).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Barriers to Adoption of Commercial Green Buildings in India: A Review

Saha

Hiremath

Prasad

et al. 2021

Journal of Infrastructure Development

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The global construction sector accounts for 13.2% of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP). It not only contributes to the economic growth engine of the world but also climate changes due to its high energy footprint. Sustainable buildings have the potential to reduce the adverse impacts of the construction industry, but their adoption is slow due to hindrances. The aim of this paper is to study literature on barriers to green building adoption to date and highlight the overlapping and unique barriers specific to India in comparison to a few prominent countries, and provide solutions and recommendations for future research. The methodology has been an extensive literature review of the barriers to green building (GB) adoption. The key findings, namely barriers, were classified under economic, governmental, organizational and social perception, information, technology and material categories. Barriers unique to India and a few other developing countries are an extension of project schedules, lack of research and developmental works, lack of public motivation, poor building code enforcement, high payback period, uncertain supply of green materials, improper implementation of policy framework and performance of green building technologies (GBT’s). The GB construction sector is fragmented around the world. Even the GB definition is not the same across the globe although the environmental aspect is the same. Similarly, there are unique and overlapping challenges in GB adoption globally. Buildings in usage perspectives can be classified into residential and non-residential. This study looks only at non-residential GBs due to their homogenous nature. There is a dearth of specific studies related to the adoption of GBs in India. This study aims to fulfil the gap of India’s standing in the barriers to GB adoption with respect to the developed and developing countries. JEL Classification: I18

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“…According to the previous literature [ 21 – 25 ], combining with the abovementioned relative assumption, the tripartite evolutionary game model of a green housing market has been constructed. Moreover, the logical relationship between each subject in the evolutionary game is shown in Figure 1 .…”

Section: Model Assumption and Formulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The government should provide incentives to developers and consumers, so as to make the green housing market move toward the optimal balance. Feng et al [ 21 ] found the interest equilibrium point among green building stakeholders (government, construction units and consumers) by building a game model, so as to provide reference for the development of green building led by the government. Chen [ 22 ] analyzed the economic benefits of green building by building a bilateral game model between green building developers, consumers, and the government.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game and Simulation of Green Housing Market Subject Behavior in China

Qian

Wang

et al. 2022

Computational Intelligence and Neuroscience

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In China, driven by the national “3060” double carbon targets (i.e., reaching peak carbon emissions by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060), green housing has become one of the major fields to reduce carbon emissions, facilitating the achievement of the double carbon targets. Promoting the growth of green housing is an important way for the real estate industry to achieve low-carbon transformation and improve the quality of housing. Meanwhile, the construction industry also can benefit from green housing to achieve its energy conservation and emission reduction targets. Therefore, it is critical to boost and maintain the sustainable growth of the green housing market in China. However, the literature has not focused attention on the market behavior of the green housing market in China. This study proposes a tripartite evolutionary game model to investigate the subject behavior of the green housing market in China. This model consists of three major subjects in a green housing market: developers, consumers, and governments. Based on this model, this study analyzes the stability of the strategy options for each stakeholder and identifies the stable conditions of strategy portfolios to reach the equilibrium points of the game system. The validity of the proposed tripartite evolutionary game model is tested through the simulation of the impacts from various factors on system evolution. According to the impacts of factors and the stable conditions of strategies, this paper puts forward relevant policy suggestions for the healthy and sustainable growth of China’s green housing market.

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Stakeholder games in the evolution and development of green buildings in China: Government-led perspective

Cited by 45 publications

References 28 publications

How Do Government Policies Promote Green Housing Diffusion in China? A Complex Network Game Context

How Do Government Policies Promote Green Housing Diffusion in China? A Complex Network Game Context

Barriers to Adoption of Commercial Green Buildings in India: A Review

Evolutionary Game and Simulation of Green Housing Market Subject Behavior in China

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