Spontaneous trait transference: Communicators take on the qualities they describe in others.

Skowronski, John J.; Carlston, Donal E.; Mae, Lynda; Crawford, Matthew T.

doi:10.1037/0022-3514.74.4.837

Cited by 141 publications

(248 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…It is interesting that this mechanism is inconsistent with trait rating results reported by Skowronski et al (1998) and Mae et al (1999). Their research on spontaneous trait transference suggests that implications of spontaneously inferred traits probably do not include general halo effects.…”

Section: Spontaneous Antonyms: Going Beyond Initial Inferencesmentioning

confidence: 85%

Spontaneous trait inferences are bound to actors' faces: Evidence from a false recognition paradigm.

Todorov

Uleman²

2002

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

224

268

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A false recognition paradigm showed that spontaneous trait inferences (STIs) are bound to the person performing a trait-implying behavior. In 6 experiments, participants memorized faces and behavioral sentences. When faces were paired with implied traits in a recognition test, participants falsely recognized these traits more often than unrelated traits paired with the same faces or the same traits paired with familiar faces. The effect was obtained for a large set of behaviors (120), each presented for 5 s, and for behaviors that participants did not subsequently recognize or recall. Antonyms of the implied traits were falsely recognized less often than unrelated traits, suggesting that STIs have extended implications. Explicit person-trait judgments predicted both false recognition and response times for implied traits.

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Section: Spontaneous Antonyms: Going Beyond Initial Inferencesmentioning

confidence: 85%

Spontaneous trait inferences are bound to actors' faces: Evidence from a false recognition paradigm.

Todorov

Uleman²

2002

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

224

268

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“…The central aim of the current research was to examine the extent to which these stereotype-based inference processes are moderated by the availability of processing capacity. Research into the efficiency of STIs has shown that, in general, the STI process is neither disrupted nor enhanced by concurrent load (Lupfer, Clark, & Hutcherson, 1990;Winter et al, 1985; but also see Skowronski, Carlston, Mae & Crawford, 1998). This suggests that the STI process is quite efficient (although some interference with the STI process has been found at very high-load levels; Uleman, Newman, & Winter, 1992).…”

Section: Stereotypical Inferences 293mentioning

confidence: 92%

Capacity and Comprehension: Spontaneous Stereotyping Under Cognitive Load

et al. 2004

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Ad van Knippenberg University of NijmegenPeople tend to make spontaneous trait inferences (STIs) when confronted with the behavior of others. Recent research has demonstrated that these STIs may be moderated by contextual cues such as stereotypic category labels. The central aim of the current research was to investigate the role of cognitive resources in this process. Two experiments were performed in which STIs were measured using a probe recognition paradigm under low or high cognitive load. Under high cognitive load, STIs were less likely for stereotype-inconsistent than stereotype-consistent behaviors. Compared to baseline, STIs for inconsistent behaviors were less strong under high cognitive load. Under low-load, no differences in STIs as a function of stereotypes were found. These findings support the idea that stereotypes are especially likely to affect STIs when resources are low.

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“…For example, research has shown that adults tend to dislike the bearer of information they disagree with even when the bearer of the information herself disagrees with that information being shared (Manis, Cornell, & Moore, 1974) and that adults will see an individual as, for example, more angry if that individual has described another person as angry (Skowronski, Carlston, Mae, & Crawford, 1998). In addition, even novel objects elicit rapid evaluation (Duckworth, Bargh, Garcia, & Chaiken, 2002), and therefore it is not unreasonable to think that quick evaluations occur when observing other humans, a prediction at the heart of the affective tagging hypothesis (Olson, et al, in preparation).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Judgments of the lucky across development and culture.

Olson¹,

Dunham²,

Dweck³

et al. 2008

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

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For millennia human beings have believed that it is morally wrong to judge others by the fortuitous or unfortunate events that befall them or by the actions of another person. Rather, an individual's own intended, deliberate actions should be the basis of his/her evaluation, reward and punishment. In a series of studies we investigate whether such rules guide the judgments of children. The first three studies demonstrate that children view lucky others as more likely than unlucky others to perform intentional good actions. Children similarly assess the siblings of lucky others as more likely to perform intentional good actions than the siblings of unlucky others. The next three studies demonstrate that children as young as 3 years believe that lucky people are nicer than unlucky people. The final two studies find that Japanese children also demonstrate a robust preference for the lucky and their associates. These findings are discussed in relation to Lerner's just world theory and Piaget's immanent justice research and in relation to the development of intergroup attitudes. Keywords/phrases (up to 5)preference for the lucky; immanent justice; evaluative contagion; social cognitive development; cross-cultural psychology In many societies and legal systems across time, one moral tenet has reigned supreme. Individuals are to be judged by the purposeful actions they commit, and not by the random events that befall them. This understanding has been broad and deep, evident across time and place, from Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Roman Law (e.g., animus nocendi), and English law (e.g., mens rea) to the Modern Penal Law in the United States and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. This fundamental moral dictum was most clearly described in the 13 th century by Henry Bracton: "A crime is not committed unless an

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Spontaneous trait transference: Communicators take on the qualities they describe in others.

Cited by 141 publications

References 27 publications

Spontaneous trait inferences are bound to actors' faces: Evidence from a false recognition paradigm.

Spontaneous trait inferences are bound to actors' faces: Evidence from a false recognition paradigm.

Capacity and Comprehension: Spontaneous Stereotyping Under Cognitive Load

Judgments of the lucky across development and culture.

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