Social Capital at the Top: Effects of Social Similarity and Status on CEO Compensation

Belliveau, Maura A.; OʼReilly, Charles A.; Wade, James B.

doi:10.5465/257069

Cited by 175 publications

(209 citation statements)

References 59 publications

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“…Network theorists have suggested that social ties between individuals that extend across different contexts (e.g., on different boards) will lead to particularly high levels of social cohesion (Emirbayer and Goodwin, 1994). Where individuals have common memberships on multiple other boards with each other, they have more shared experiences and a stronger basis for mutual identification (Coleman, 1988;Belliveau, O'Reilly, and Wade, 1996). Further, the greater familiarity resulting from such ties may lead majority members to make more individuated assessments of minority directors (Gaertner et al, 1989; Messick and Mackie, 1989), reducing the tendency toward negative stereotyping associated with out-group categorization.…”

Section: Social Capital and Minority Influencementioning

confidence: 99%

How Experience and Network Ties Affect the Influence of Demographic Minorities on Corporate Boards

Westphal

Milton

2000

Administrative Science Quarterly

609

442

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Section: Social Capital and Minority Influencementioning

confidence: 99%

How Experience and Network Ties Affect the Influence of Demographic Minorities on Corporate Boards

Westphal

Milton

2000

Administrative Science Quarterly

609

442

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“…Research on executive compensation has demonstrated that the CEO often has a significant ability to influence how his or her compensation is set (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004;Lorsch & MacIver, 1989;Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 1989). For instance, a number of studies have demonstrated that CEOs can increase their pay beyond what is justified by economic determinants through exercising social influence, providing rewards to the board members, and ingratiating themselves with the board (e.g., Belliveau, O'Reilly, & Wade, 1996;O'Reilly & Main, 2010;Tosi, Misangyi, Fanelli, Waldman, & Yammarino, 2004;Westphal, 1998). For example, in two studies Main, O'Reilly, and Wade (1995) found that, after controlling for firm performance and human capital, if the CEO had longer tenure on the board than the chair of the compensation, the CEO received 10% more in compensation.…”

Section: Narcissism and Executive Compensationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Narcissistic CEOs and executive compensation

OʼReilly¹,

Doerr²,

Caldwell³

et al. 2014

The Leadership Quarterly

Self Cite

223

151

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Narcissism is characterized by traits such as dominance, self-confidence, a sense of entitlement, grandiosity, and low empathy. There is growing evidence that individuals with these characteristics often emerge as leaders, and that narcissistic CEOs may make more impulsive and risky decisions. We suggest that these tendencies may also affect how compensation is allocated among top management teams. Using employee ratings of personality for the CEOs of 32 prominent high-technology firms, we investigate whether more narcissistic CEOs have compensation packages that are systematically different from their less narcissistic peers, and specifically whether these differences increase the longer the CEO stays with the firm. As predicted, we find that more narcissistic CEOs who have been with their firm longer receive more total direct compensation (salary, bonus, and stock options), have more money in their total shareholdings, and have larger discrepancies between their own (higher) compensation and the other members of their team.

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“…3 See Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992), Belliveau et al (1996), Woolcock (1998), Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998). 4 See Coleman (1990), Fukuyama (1995), Putnam (1995), Thomas (1996).…”

Section: Social Capital In Microfinance: a Brief Review Of The Literamentioning

confidence: 99%

Defining Social Collateral in Microfinance Group Lending

Postelnicu¹,

Hermes²,

Szafarz³

2014

Microfinance Institutions

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Microfinance group lending with joint liability allows asset-poor individuals to replace physical collateral by social collateral. The literature on microfinance lacks a rigid framework for analyzing the consequences of using social collateral for borrowing behavior and repayment. This paper fills the gap by providing a theoretical framework to evaluate the impact of social collateral pledged by group borrowers on group lending repayment. Our approach is novel as we take into account the external ties of group borrowers, i.e. the social ties linking borrowers to non-borrowers from their community, whereas previous work in this field has looked solely at internal ties (i.e. between group members). One of the important features of our model is that we stress the impact of network configuration on the amount of social collateral pledged. Our model shows why the group lending methodology works better in rural areas than in urban areas, namely because rural social networks are typically denser than urban ones, which results in higher social collateral. AbstractMicrofinance group lending with joint liability allows asset-poor individuals to replace physical collateral by social collateral. The literature on microfinance lacks a rigid framework for analyzing the consequences of using social collateral for borrowing behavior and repayment. This paper fills the gap by providing a theoretical framework to evaluate the impact of social collateral pledged by group borrowers on group lending repayment. Our approach is novel as we take into account the external ties of group borrowers, i.e. the social ties linking borrowers to non-borrowers from their community, whereas previous work in this field has looked solely at internal ties (i.e. between group members). One of the important features of our model is that we stress the impact of network configuration on the amount of social collateral pledged. Our model shows why the group lending methodology works better in rural areas than in urban areas, namely because rural social networks are typically denser than urban ones, which results in higher social collateral.

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Social Capital at the Top: Effects of Social Similarity and Status on CEO Compensation

Cited by 175 publications

References 59 publications

How Experience and Network Ties Affect the Influence of Demographic Minorities on Corporate Boards

How Experience and Network Ties Affect the Influence of Demographic Minorities on Corporate Boards

Narcissistic CEOs and executive compensation

Defining Social Collateral in Microfinance Group Lending

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