Should we select for genetic moral enhancement? A thought experiment using the MoralKinder (MK+) haplotype

Faust, Halley S.

doi:10.1007/s11017-008-9089-6

Cited by 23 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…It is not necessary to assume that some singular morality prevails so that genetic moral enhancement has a unique target [25]; multiple moralities could each be upheld by a segment of a future society, much like today. People don't suppose that what they think is truly moral is best kept illegal -morality must be beneficial, according to common opinion.…”

Section: Moral Scenario One: Make Our Child Moralmentioning

confidence: 99%

My Brain Made Me Moral: Moral Performance Enhancement for Realists

Shook

2016

Neuroethics

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Section: Moral Scenario One: Make Our Child Moralmentioning

confidence: 99%

My Brain Made Me Moral: Moral Performance Enhancement for Realists

Shook

2016

Neuroethics

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“…However, some of the same issues arise in cases of selection as in cases of neuroenhancement discussed here, and there is some literature exploring these. For example, Faust (2008) argues that if parents were able to select for morally desirable traits in their future children it would be desirable, and probably obligatory, for them to do so, and Walker (2009) argues that principled reason not to select for moral virtues in one's children, unless there is a principled reason not to engage in selection at all. 3 For criticism of these claims, see Agar (2010), Andreadis (2010), Arnhart (2010) and Bronstein (2010).…”

Section: Further Questionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Morality of Moral Neuroenhancement

Douglas

2014

Handbook of Neuroethics

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Abstract. This chapter reviews recent philosophical and neuroethical literature on the morality of moral neuroenhancements. It first briefly outlines the main moral arguments that have been made concerning moral status neuroenhancements. These are neurointerventions that would augment the moral status of human persons. It then surveys recent debate regarding moral desirability neuroenhancements: neurointerventions that augment that the moral desirability of human character traits, motives or conduct. This debate has contested, among other claims (i) Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu's contention that there is a moral imperative to pursue the development of moral desirability neuroenhancements, (ii) Thomas Douglas' claim that voluntarily undergoing moral desirability neuroenhancements would often be morally permissible, and (iii) David DeGrazia's claim that moral desirability neuroenhancements would often be morally desirable. The chapter discusses a number of concerns that have been raised regarding moral desirability neuroenhancements, including concerns that they would restrict freedom, would produce only a superficial kind of moral improvement, would rely on technologies that are liable to be misused, and would frequently misfire, resulting in moral deterioration rather than moral improvement.

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“…7.For discussion of the other-regarding reasons bearing on selection decisions, see Faust 2008, Walker 2009, Douglas et al 2010, and Elster 2011.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Procreative Altruism: Beyond Individualism in Reproductive Selection

Douglas¹,

Devolder²

2013

Journal of Medicine and Philosophy

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Existing debate on procreative selection focuses on the well-being of the future child. However, selection decisions can also have significant effects on the well-being of others. Moreover, these effects may run in opposing directions; some traits conducive to the well-being of the selected child may be harmful to others, whereas other traits that limit the child’s well-being may preserve or increase that of others. Prominent selection principles defended to date instruct parents to select a child, of the possible children they could have, likely to have a good (or nonbad) life, but they do not instruct parents to independently take the well-being of others into account. We refer to these principles as individualistic selection principles. We propose a new selection principle—Procreative Altruism—according to which parents have significant moral reason to select a child whose existence can be expected to contribute more to (or detract less from) the well-being of others than any alternative child they could have. We present the case for adopting Procreative Altruism alongside any of the major individualistic selection principles proposed to date and defend this two-principle model against a range of objections.

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Should we select for genetic moral enhancement? A thought experiment using the MoralKinder (MK+) haplotype

Cited by 23 publications

References 26 publications

My Brain Made Me Moral: Moral Performance Enhancement for Realists

My Brain Made Me Moral: Moral Performance Enhancement for Realists

The Morality of Moral Neuroenhancement

Procreative Altruism: Beyond Individualism in Reproductive Selection

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