Service Quality Regulation in Electricity Distribution and Retail

Fumagalli, Elena; Schiavo, Luca Lo; Delestre, Florence

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-73444-4

Cited by 70 publications

(83 citation statements)

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“…For example, in Finland and Norway, the reliability index of the RPS is T-SAIDI and ENS, respectively [25,26]. In general, the RPS diagram of this scheme is similar to the one presented in Figure 1.…”

Section: Scheme 2: Designing the Rps Based On The Average System Relimentioning

confidence: 93%

Designing a regulatory framework for efficient integration of distributed generation technologies

Jooshaki¹,

Abbaspour²,

Fotuhi‐Firuzabad³

et al. 2017

Turk J Elec Eng & Comp Sci

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This paper focuses on the designing procedure of a regulatory framework in distribution networks with the main goal being to facilitate the integration of distributed generation (DG) units. The proposed framework is based on the concept of the reward penalty scheme (RPS) and creates effective financial incentives for distribution companies (DISCOs) in improving the quality of their services by applying DG units. To achieve this goal, reliability indices and annual energy losses of a distribution network are considered as two significant measures used in designing the structure of several RPSs. Employing these schemes, the regulators can quantify the quality of services provided by DISCOs. In order to examine the abilities of the proposed method, a case study on a test distribution system connected to bus 6 of the RBTS is performed. The obtained results show that a well-designed regulatory scheme can motivate DISCOs to adopt higher penetration of DG in such a way that their technical criteria can be improved.

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Section: Scheme 2: Designing the Rps Based On The Average System Relimentioning

confidence: 93%

Designing a regulatory framework for efficient integration of distributed generation technologies

Jooshaki¹,

Abbaspour²,

Fotuhi‐Firuzabad³

et al. 2017

Turk J Elec Eng & Comp Sci

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“…Slope of the scheme indicates the financial value of quality indicator, which is called incentive rate. In some countries, they use customer surveys to determine the incentive rate [5]. In [12] the incentive rates are defined according to customer surveys as follows:…”

Section: Regulations For System Reliabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If DSO fails to fulfil these standards, it will be penalized and usually must pay compensation to the affected customers [5]. Usually the amount of compensation varies according to the customer type and increases with increasing deviation from the defined standards [4].…”

Section: Regulation For Customer Reliabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…GS will be determined by the regulator, but PQC is a contract between the customer and a DSO [2]. In some regimes of PBR, unfulfilled GS standards lead to a decrease in earnings of DSOs [5]. As shown in [13], it is necessary to use GS and PQC along with RPS.…”

Section: Regulation For Customer Reliabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Quality Regulation is a new and important issue in the electricity market which was introduced in Italy in 2000 for the first time [4]. The purpose of quality regulation is to implement the economic regulations to maintain distribution network stability [5]. Therefore, quality regulation imposes new financial risks on DSOs.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Developing a New Risk Assessment Methodology for Distribution System Operators Regulated by Quality Regulation Considering Reclosing Time

Saboorideilami¹,

Abdi²

2014

Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology

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-In the restructured electricity market, Performance-Based Regulation (PBR) regimehas been introduced to the distribution network. To ensure the network stability, this regime is used along with quality regulations. Quality regulation impose new financial risks on distribution system operators (DSOs). The poor quality of the network will result in reduced revenues for DSOs. The mentioned financial risks depend on the quality indices of the system. Based on annual variation of these indices, the cost of quality regulation will also vary. In this paper with regard to reclosing fault in distribution network, we develop a risk-based method to assess the financial risks caused by quality regulation for DSOs. Furthermore, in order to take the stochastic behavior of the distribution network and quality indices variations into account, time-sequential Monte Carlo simulation method is used. Using the proposed risk method, the effect of taking reclosing time into account will be examined on system quality indicators and the cost of quality regulation in Swedish rural reliability test system (SRRTS). The results show that taking reclosing fault into consideration, affects the system quality indicators, particularly annual average interruption frequency index of the system (SAIFI). Moreover taking reclosing fault into consideration also affects the quality regulations cost. Therefore, considering reclosing time provides a more realistic viewpoint about the financial risks arising from quality regulation for DSOs.

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Reliability incentive regulation based on reward‐penalty mechanism using distribution feeders clustering

Khonakdar-Tarsi

Fotuhi‐Firuzabad

Ehsan

et al. 2021

Int Trans Electr Energ Syst

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Summary This paper proposes an approach to enhance the reliability regulation based on the relative performance. In the proposed approach, the distribution system feeders are clustered based on the parameters, which cannot be controlled by distribution companies. Afterward, a reliability incentive regulation is applied to each cluster so that the performance of each feeder is compared to its counterparts in the same cluster. The quality regulation is designed based on the reward‐penalty mechanism, which penalizes feeders whose performance is worse than a benchmark and rewards those providing a performance higher than the benchmark. Then, the reward and penalty associated to the electric distribution company are determined to summarize the rewards and penalties for all feeders. Having this approach implemented, utilities compete to make more profits by serving customers at higher reliability levels. To assess the effectiveness of proposed method, it is applied to a real distribution network containing 194 feeders.

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Service Quality Regulation in Electricity Distribution and Retail

Cited by 70 publications

References 0 publications

Designing a regulatory framework for efficient integration of distributed generation technologies

Designing a regulatory framework for efficient integration of distributed generation technologies

Developing a New Risk Assessment Methodology for Distribution System Operators Regulated by Quality Regulation Considering Reclosing Time

Reliability incentive regulation based on reward‐penalty mechanism using distribution feeders clustering

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