Sensations and Brain Processes

The philosophy of phenomenal consciousness

“…One obvious way is to claim that each type of conscious experience is identical with a certain type of brain event: to experience the smell of fresh coffee, for example, is just to have a particular pattern of neural firing in a certain brain area. Proponents of this so-called 'type-physicalism' include Smart (1959) and more recently Polger (2004). Notice that identifying a type of conscious experience with a type of neural event entails that anyone lacking that type of neural event also lacks the relevant type of conscious experience.…”

On Ensuring that Physicalism is Not a Dual Attribute Theory In Sheep’s Clothing

“…There remain interesting questions about the nature of oneÕs knowledge that the term water applies to H 2 O that are outside our remit, though surely we can say that this much is reasonably non-controversial: one can understand the term water without knowing that it applies to H 2 O in all possible worlds, and this is part of the account of why the sentence Water=H 2 O is a posteriori. NOTES 1 See, e.g., Smart (1959), Lewis (1971), Medlin (1967), and Armstrong (1968). 2 Smart (1959), Armstrong (1968), Lewis (1972).…”

“…NOTES 1 See, e.g., Smart (1959), Lewis (1971), Medlin (1967), and Armstrong (1968). 2 Smart (1959), Armstrong (1968), Lewis (1972). 3 See, e.g., Block and Stalnaker (1999), and for responses Chalmers andJackson (2001), and.…”

Modal Arguments against Physicalism in View of Scientific Findings Concerning Pain

“…One physicalist view -quite popular in the 1960s -is the mind-brain identity theory which maintains that mental states are identical to brain states, by which they mean a true identity, not merely a correlation [1][2][3]. For example, identity theorists claim that an experience of pain is merely a brain process.…”