Security analysis for Cyber-Physical Systems against stealthy deception attacks

Abstract

Security of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) against cyber attacks is an important yet challenging problem. Since most cyber attacks happen in erratic ways, it is difficult to describe them systematically. In this paper, instead of identifying a specific cyber attack model, we are focused on analyzing the system's response during cyber attacks. Deception attacks (or false data injection attacks), which are performed by tampering with system components or data, are not of particular concern if they can be easily detected by the system's monitoring system. However, intelligent cyber attackers can avoid being detected by the monitoring system by carefully design cyber attacks. Our main objective is to investigate the performance of such stealthy deception attacks from the system's perspective. We investigate three kinds of stealthy deception attacks according to the attacker's ability to compromise the system. Based on the information about the dynamics of the system and existing hypothesis testing algorithms, we derive the necessary and sufficient conditions under which the attacker could perform each kind of attack without being detected. In the end, we illustrate the threat of these cyber attacks using an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) navigation example.

Towards a Framework for Assuring Cyber Physical System Security

“…Cheolhyeon Kwon, et al, in [45] study the performance of stealthy deception attacks according to the attackers' ability to compromise the system from a system's perspective.…”

Security analysis and fault detection against stealthy replay attacks

“…Furthermore, in Yang et al (2017), a distributed state estimator with an event-triggered scheme is formulated to defend against false data injection attacks in Wireless Sensor Networks. An approach Kwon et al (2013) has been made recently to investigate security problems against deception attacks. In this approach Kwon et al (2013), instead of defining a unique cyber-attack model, authors focussed on analysing the system's response during false data injection attacks.…”

“…An approach Kwon et al (2013) has been made recently to investigate security problems against deception attacks. In this approach Kwon et al (2013), instead of defining a unique cyber-attack model, authors focussed on analysing the system's response during false data injection attacks. Finally, they proposed the necessary and sufficient conditions under which the attacker could perform each kind of attack without being detected.…”

Hybrid Detection of Intermittent Cyber-Attacks in Networked Power Systems

“…Common scenarios concern replay attacks [3], where the adversary records measurements for a certain period of time and then resends them, therefore replacing the real ones, denial of service attacks [4][5][6], where the adversary jams channels that transmit control commands or sensor measurements, and data corruption cyber-attacks, where the adversary injects system data with biased attack signals [7][8][9]. Stealthy attacks, that cause system malfunctions, while remaining undetected in the process, have also been extensively studied in [10][11][12][13].…”