Securing Named Data Networks

Abstract

Despite decades of research on the Internet security, we constantly hear about mega data breaches and malware infections affecting hundreds of millions of hosts. The key reason is that the current threat model of the Internet relies on two assumptions that no longer hold true: (1) Web servers, hosting the content, are secure, (2) each Internet connection starts from the original content provider and terminates at the content consumer. Internet security is today merely patched on top of the TCP/IP protocol stack. In order to achieve comprehensive security for the Internet, we believe that a clean-slate approach must be adopted where a content based security model is employed. Named Data Networking (NDN) is a step in this direction which is envisioned to be the next generation Internet architecture based on a content centric communication model. NDN is currently being designed with security as a key requirement, and thus to support content integrity, authenticity, confidentiality and privacy. However, in order to meet such a requirement, one needs to overcome several challenges, especially in either large operational environments or resource constrained networks. In this paper, we explore the security challenges in achieving comprehensive content security in NDN and propose a research agenda to address some of the challenges.

A Novel Security Scheme Supported by Certificateless Digital Signature and Blockchain in Named Data Networking

“…The ISE would play the role of the KGC, which uses the system parameters k as its input and generates the system public parameters params and the system master key s as output, as shown in Expression (3).…”

“…The data-centric architecture implies that NDNs have new security requirements to protect data rather than the communication channels in the IP networks. The dataoriented security mainly includes data authentication, data integrity, data confidentiality, and data privacy [3,4]. Data authentication and data integrity are our focuses.…”

A Systematic Literature Mapping on the Security of 5G and Vertical Applications

“…Adversaries can also take advantage of the flexibility of orchestration, internal agents, authentication failure, physical downlink control channel, confidentiality failures in the communication channel, sensor networks vulnerabilities, cloud radio access networks vulnerabilities [Jeyakumar and Rajabhushanam, 2019], C-RAN vulnerabilities [Tian et al, 2017], EAP-TLS vulnerabilities [Zhang et al, 2020b], Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) vulnerabilities [Zhao et al, 2021d], machine learning models vulnerabilities [Suomalainen et al, 2020], software-defined mobile networks vulnerabilities, named data networks vulnerabilities [Bertino and Nabeel, 2018], MEC vulnerabilities, UE vulnerabilities [Amgoune and Mazri, 2018;Mahmoud et al, 2021], D2D communication vulnerabilities [Abd-Elrahman et al, 2015a,b], System Information Block (SIB) and RRC message parameters in 5G NR, edge security flaw, key sent over an insecure channel, security flaw in NS [Martini et al, 2020;Kotulski et al, 2017;Sattar et al, 2021;Cáceres-Hidalgo and Avila-Pesantez, 2021;Olimid and Nencioni, 2020], credential theft, devices without robust security mechanisms, 5G-AKA vulnerabilities [Basin et al, 2018;Pari et al, 2019], and security flaws in NFV and SDN [Ahmad et al, 2021[Ahmad et al, , 2019[Ahmad et al, , 2018Taheribakhsh et al, 2020]. Operating Systems (OS) using insecure protocols provide excessive privileges, IoT devices may have different protocols, lack processing robustness, and fail to control sensitive data privacy.…”