Securely implementable social choice functions in divisible and nonexcludable public good economies with quasi‐linear utility functions

Abstract

This paper studies the possibility of secure implementation (Saijo, T., T. Sjöström, and T. Yamato (2007) "Secure Implementation," Theoretical Economics 2, pp.203-229) in divisible and nonexcludable public good economies with quasi-linear utility functions. Although Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato (2007) showed that the Groves mechanisms (Groves, T. (1973) "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica 41, pp.617-631) are securely implementable in some of the economies, we have the following negative result: securely implementable social choice functions are dictatorial or constant in divisible and non-excludable public good economies with quasi-linear utility functions.