The Cambridge History of the Cold War 2010
DOI: 10.1017/chol9780521837217.019
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Science, technology, and the Cold War

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Cited by 14 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…From the 1970s onwards, the United States was cementing an economic transition based upon high-tech innovation, including fiber optics, internet, commercial satellites and personalised computers rather than manufacturing. At the same time, the Soviet Union was unable to capitalise on those trends and remained increasingly left behind in economic competition (Reynolds 2010). This backwardness eventually led to the rise of Gorbachev and reformers to power, characterised by a cognitive restructuring modulated on the rejection of Stalinist-like institutions and growth-impairing policies (Kotkin 2001;Snyder 2003).…”
Section: The Overall Utility Of Polarity As a Conceptual Assetmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…From the 1970s onwards, the United States was cementing an economic transition based upon high-tech innovation, including fiber optics, internet, commercial satellites and personalised computers rather than manufacturing. At the same time, the Soviet Union was unable to capitalise on those trends and remained increasingly left behind in economic competition (Reynolds 2010). This backwardness eventually led to the rise of Gorbachev and reformers to power, characterised by a cognitive restructuring modulated on the rejection of Stalinist-like institutions and growth-impairing policies (Kotkin 2001;Snyder 2003).…”
Section: The Overall Utility Of Polarity As a Conceptual Assetmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is true that the recorded deaths by the USSR dwarf that of any Western nation, but it has largely been ignored by Russian historians that many of the deaths were the result of callous and ruthless attitudes of Red Army Generals, who cared little for the welfare of their soldiers (Kilcullen, 2020). Reynolds (2010) argues that, obsessed with sacrifice, commanders would continually order futile attacks against enemy positions even when no tactical victory could be achieved. American and British wartime combat casualties were considerably smaller than those of the Red Army, but allied planners would take measures which were designed to reduce risk to their military personnel through the use of technology, a disciplined command and control structure but also working to the pressures placed on them by a democratic political system, eager not to see unnecessary sacrifice (Rees, 2012).…”
Section: Why Do Russian Soldiers Fight?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Early on, and building upon vast wartime efforts such as the Manhattan Project that had led to the development of the US atomic bomb, these 'big science' project concentrated on the defence sector. Later, however, they rapidly spread to a wide variety of social and natural sciences disciplines (Reynolds 2010;Solovey 2001;Galison 1992).…”
Section: The Golden Age Of Future Studies: Big Science and The Dark Side Of Modernitymentioning
confidence: 99%