Role of Opportunism and Trust in Construction Projects: Empirical Evidence from China

Lu, Ping; Qian, Lamei; Chu, Zhaofang; Xu, Xiaoyan

doi:10.1061/(asce)me.1943-5479.0000401

Cited by 61 publications

(64 citation statements)

References 62 publications

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“…It includes the behavior which violates relational norms, and these norms are not specified in a contract but are embedded in the common understanding of the parties (Luo, ). One manifestation of weak‐form opportunistic behavior is undermining the interests of the counterparty, which leads to declination in trust, hindering the realization of common goals, and negative effect on satisfaction (Benton & Maloni, ; Lu, Qian, Chu, & Xu, ; Zhou, Zhang, Zhuang, & Zhou, ). Strategies such as resource sharing and the equitable allocation of risks are conducive to the establishment and maintenance of mutual trust (Chen & Chen, ; Ling, Ong, Ke, Wang, & Zou, ).…”

Section: Theoretical Background and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Effect of Task Conflict on Relationship Quality: The Mediating Role of Relational Behavior

Guo

2019

Negotiation Conflict Man Res

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Previous studies have paid insufficient attention to how interorganizational task conflict affects relationship quality between parties. On the basis of survey data from the construction industry, this study explores the impact of interorganizational task conflict on relationship quality and the mediating role of relational behavior. The empirical results reveal that task conflict affects relationship quality (including satisfaction, trust, and commitment) negatively. Relational behavior has three dimensions: flexibility, information exchange, and solidarity. Information exchange partially mediates the effect of task conflict on satisfaction, trust, and commitment; solidarity plays a partial mediating role in the impact of task conflict on trust and commitment; and flexibility only mediates the impact of task conflict on satisfaction partially. Relational behavior in accordance with relational norms can partially account for the impact of interorganizational task conflict on relationship quality. This paper also provides practical guidance for construction practitioners.

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Section: Theoretical Background and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Effect of Task Conflict on Relationship Quality: The Mediating Role of Relational Behavior

Guo

2019

Negotiation Conflict Man Res

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“…Opportunism is often defined as "seeking self-interest by trickery" [36]; it includes misleading, disguising, and resorting to other deceptive or immoral behaviors, and is one of the major risks faced by the parties involved in cooperation [37]. Once opportunistic behavior occurs, it will have a negative impact on the performance of the cooperative project and even lead to disputes between partners [38]. Many scholars have hitherto conducted research on the determinants, consequences, and the mechanism governing opportunistic behavior.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Contractor Cooperation Mechanism and Evolution of the Green Supply Chain in Mega Projects

et al. 2018

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The large scale of construction in mega projects leads to significant environmental and socioeconomic impacts; thus, the projects should also exhibit greater social responsibility. Adopting green supply chain management in the construction process is an important way to realize the goal of sustainable development of mega projects. Because the green supply chain behavior during construction is mainly demonstrated by contractors, it is especially important to study the evolutionary trend of their behavior. Thus, to explore the cooperative relationship among contractors, this paper considers a lengthy construction period, multi-agent participation dynamics, and opportunistic behavior—all are key features of mega projects—and establishes an evolutionary game model. Specifically, a replicator dynamic equation is used to describe the long-term effects of the contractor’s decisions. Equilibrium determinants are then analyzed and simulated. The results show that the initial probabilities of the two types of contractors (main contractor and subcontractor) demonstrating opportunistic behaviors have a significant effect on the direction of evolution of the mega project. The main contractor, who dominates the subsidy allocation by the government and project owner, should pay attention to maintaining a balance in the income distribution between him or her and the subcontractor. Additionally, there is an optimal distribution coefficient for the subsidy that minimizes the overall probability of opportunistic behavior. This paper provides a point of reference for the decisions of the main contractor and the subcontractor in the green supply chain of mega projects.

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“…The authors also mentioned that transaction costs are affected by all items related to project complexity, uncertainties, engineering completeness, contractor involvement, competition between bidders, level of interaction between engineering and construction, required guarantees, incentive and disincentive clauses, and allocation of risks (Li et al 2015). Lu et al (2015b) conducted another study in which they developed empirical research using more than two hundred and twenty-five agents from the Chinese construction industry, including contractors, contractors, engineering firms and supervisors, which resulted in a finding that opportunism contrasted with confidence in projects, affects the success of the project, and should be considered a transaction cost. They also reported that the relationship between opportunism and trust is influenced by the level of uncertainty of a project and not by the complexity of the project.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Identification of Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Transaction Costs in Industrial Construction Engineering Projects

Fonseca

Vanalle

Camarotto

2018

Journal of Civil Engineering and Management

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Construction costs comprise not only production but also transaction costs, which can be categorized as ex-ante (pre-contractual) and ex-post (post-contractual) costs. No evidence has been found in the literature of research about transaction costs in industrial construction engineering projects. The objective of this paper is to identify ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs in industrial engineering construction projects. To accomplish this, empirical research with 4 case studies was conducted with a large engineering firm in Brazil. This research not only identified transaction costs already found by others, dividing them into ex-ante and ex-post, but also identified that travel, RFP clarification, support to strategic decisions of the owner and knowledge transfer are transaction costs not previously identified in the researched literature but that are very relevant to the respective subject. Therefore, this research confirms that transaction costs should be considered ex-ante and ex-post by owners and contractors in industrial construction engineering projects and enlightens academics and practitioners on ways to achieve the reduction of such costs.

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Role of Opportunism and Trust in Construction Projects: Empirical Evidence from China

Cited by 61 publications

References 62 publications

The Effect of Task Conflict on Relationship Quality: The Mediating Role of Relational Behavior

The Effect of Task Conflict on Relationship Quality: The Mediating Role of Relational Behavior

Contractor Cooperation Mechanism and Evolution of the Green Supply Chain in Mega Projects

Identification of Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Transaction Costs in Industrial Construction Engineering Projects

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