Robust Reputation in Decentralized Markets

Abstract

Establishing cooperation and protecting individuals from selfish and malicious behavior are key goals in open multiagent systems. Incomplete information regarding potential interaction partners can undermine typical cooperation mechanisms such as trust and reputation, particularly in lightweight systems designed for individuals with significant resource constraints. In this article, we (i) propose extending a low-cost reputation mechanism to use gossiping to mitigate against the effect of incomplete information, (ii) define four simple aggregation strategies for incorporating gossiped information, and (iii) evaluate our model on a variety of synthetic and real-world topologies and under a range of configurations. We show that (i) gossiping can significantly reduce the potentially detrimental influence of incomplete information and the underlying network structure on lightweight reputation mechanisms, (ii) basing decisions on the most recently received gossip results in up to a 25% reduction in selfishness, and (iii) gossiping is particularly effective at aiding agents with little or no interaction history, such as when first entering a system.