Risks and implications of bovine spongiform encephalopathy for the United States: insights from other countries

Fox, John A.; Peterson, H. Christopher

doi:10.1016/j.foodpol.2004.01.003

Cited by 18 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 9 publications

(3 reference statements)

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“…After being continually reassured by their government that the country was BSE‐free, German consumers reacted particularly strongly to the discovery of domestic BSE, with beef demand declining by nearly 50%. ( 28 ) The German public did not want to consume beef without further information about BSE risks. The government was largely unprepared for this reaction.…”

Section: Social Amplification and Attenuation Of Riskmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Impact of Social Amplification and Attenuation of Risk and the Public Reaction to Mad Cow Disease in Canada

Lewis

Tyshenko

2009

Risk Analysis

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Following the detection of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in Canada, and subsequently in the United States, confidence in the safety of beef products remained high. Consumers actually increased their consumption of beef slightly after the news of an increased risk from mad cow disease, which has been interpreted as public support for beef farmers and confidence in government regulators. The Canadian public showed a markedly different reaction to the news of domestic BSE than the furious and panicked responses observed in the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan. Using the social amplification of risk framework, we show that, while other countries displayed social amplification of risk, Canada experienced a social attenuation of risk. The attenuated reaction in Canada toward mad cow disease and increased human health risks from variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) was due to the social context at the time when BSE was discovered domestically. Mortality, morbidity, and psychosocial impacts resulting from other major events such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), West Nile virus (WNV), and the U.S.-Iraq war made the theoretical risks of BSE and vCJD a lower priority, reducing its concern as a risk issue.

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Section: Social Amplification and Attenuation Of Riskmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Impact of Social Amplification and Attenuation of Risk and the Public Reaction to Mad Cow Disease in Canada

Lewis

Tyshenko

2009

Risk Analysis

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“…Public reaction to domestic BSE was also a significant factor in determining the nature, extent, and rapidity of government response. In countries where there was a strong public outcry to protect human health (as in Japan and Germany), rapid testing schemes and new risk management policies were implemented within months (Watts, 2001;Fox and Peterson, 2004).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Comparative country case study analysis using relative time anchors to determine policy drivers for bovine spongiform encephalopathy risk management

Tyshenko

Krewski

2010

IJRAM

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Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) emerged in the UK in the mid-1980s, and eventually spread to other countries, ultimately becoming a disease of global concern. Each BSE-affected country detected its first domestic case at different points in time, faced different internal and external challenge levels, and responded with different risk management policy actions. Rationalising the different responses chosen by individual countries over time is complicated by the diverse country-specific contexts, regulatory systems, and international trade practices. A semi-quantitative country comparison approach using signal events as time anchors reveals policy change and regulation occurred slowly, despite knowledge of BSE as a new, emerging zoonotic disease. Many countries viewed BSE as a 'foreign' problem, and reacted only after domestic BSE was detected. Lengthy times to implementation of risk reduction measures despite knowledge of BSE signal events in many of the later-affected countries resulted in an extended outbreak of greater magnitude.Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Tyshenko, M.G. and Krewski, D. (2010) 'Comparative country case study analysis using relative time anchors to determine policy drivers for bovine spongiform encephalopathy risk management', Int.Comparative country case study analysis using relative time anchors 365 Studies and Risk Communication. He specialises in interdisciplinary studies combining molecular biology, science policy and risk communication focusing on emerging issues including: genomics, bioinformatics, zoonotic diseases, pandemics and transmissible spongiform encephalopathy prion research.

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“…The Japanese government also assured its citizens that there was no risk from BSE, only to be embarrassed when cases were later discovered. Drawing on this and other international experience, it has been argued that the U.S. should adopt additional precautionary measures in order to reduce economic risks to the beef industry, which would suffer badly from any additional loss of confidence [15]. The effort expended by the U.S. government to avoid the levels of testing adopted in other countries might suggest that large costs are involved.…”

Section: Bse Policy-making: the High-stakes Gamblementioning

confidence: 99%

“…The effort expended by the U.S. government to avoid the levels of testing adopted in other countries might suggest that large costs are involved. Yet testing reportedly costs between $30 and $50 per head; the cost of moving the U.S. up to the European level of testing has been estimated at $210-$450 million [15]. With total U.S. beef production of approximately 25 billion pounds annually [16], this is a cost of $.01 to $.02 per pound of beef.…”

Section: Bse Policy-making: the High-stakes Gamblementioning

confidence: 99%

Mad Cows and Computer Models: The U.S. Response to BSE

Ackerman

Johnecheck²

2008

New Solut

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The proportion of slaughtered cattle tested for BSE is much smaller in the U.S. than in Europe and Japan, leaving the U.S. heavily dependent on statistical models to estimate both the current prevalence and the spread of BSE. We examine the models relied on by USDA, finding that the prevalence model provides only a rough estimate, due to limited data availability. Reassuring forecasts from the model of the spread of BSE depend on the arbitrary constraint that worst-case values are assumed by only one of 17 key parameters at a time. In three of the six published scenarios with multiple worst-case parameter values, there is at least a 25% probability that BSE will spread rapidly. In public policy terms, reliance on potentially flawed models can be seen as a gamble that no serious BSE outbreak will occur. Statistical modeling at this level of abstraction, with its myriad, compound uncertainties, is no substitute for precautionary policies to protect public health against the threat of epidemics such as BSE.

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Risks and implications of bovine spongiform encephalopathy for the United States: insights from other countries

Cited by 18 publications

References 9 publications

The Impact of Social Amplification and Attenuation of Risk and the Public Reaction to Mad Cow Disease in Canada

The Impact of Social Amplification and Attenuation of Risk and the Public Reaction to Mad Cow Disease in Canada

Comparative country case study analysis using relative time anchors to determine policy drivers for bovine spongiform encephalopathy risk management

Mad Cows and Computer Models: The U.S. Response to BSE

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