Revolving doors in international financial governance

Seabrooke, Leonard; Tsingou, Eleni

doi:10.1111/glob.12286

Cited by 46 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 99 publications

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“…2013). Similarly, the normalization of revolving doors‐type careers may encourage undue close communication between regulators and professionals providing services and protecting clients (Adolph 2013; Seabrooke & Tsingou 2020). An additional dynamic of professional action here is when suppliers/advisors come to favor clients' commercial interests in their views of professionalism, that is, what is accepted professional practice over the public interest and established professional norms (Dinovitzer et al .…”

Section: Professional Action In Global Wealth Chainsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Professional action in global wealth chains

Christensen

Seabrooke

Wigan

2020

Regulation & Governance

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This article provides a framework for explaining professional action in multi‐jurisdictional tax and finance environments, focusing on how relationships between clients, professionals, and regulators shape market structures. Given the complexity of tax and financial regulations within and across national systems, professionals experienced in accounting, financial, legal, and policy systems have opportunities to engage to increase information asymmetries rather than lower them. This article draws on the recent literature on Global Wealth Chains to theorize how professionals develop action profiles to exploit opportunity structures through information gaps. We develop a theoretical framework for understanding how professionals may intentionally, and as a matter of strategy, exploit information gaps in different socio‐economic contexts. We provide case vignettes of client‐professional‐regulator relationships in multi‐jurisdictional tax and finance management, highlighting how professional action shapes wealth chains and attempts at regulatory intervention. Our theoretical contribution is to link micro‐level interactions to macro‐level structures of wealth creation and protection in the transnational economic and legal order.

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Section: Professional Action In Global Wealth Chainsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Professional action in global wealth chains

Christensen

Seabrooke

Wigan

2020

Regulation & Governance

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“…Newer actors, in addition to corporations -be they networks, private standard-setting regimes, 'global commissions' or regional forums -function independently or alongside traditional IOs in arrange of policy domains. Work in this area has emphasized the importance of transnational professionals in navigating these networks and facilitating the transfer of knowledge between private and public sectors as well as across national boundaries (Seabrooke, 2014;Seabrooke & Tsingou, 2021) There is a need to grapple with the idea of public administrators who are not public servants but who work in the global (and regional) public domains and in tandem with various non-state actors. As we know from the growing socio-political analysis of the European Commission, the constitutive actors of regional policy processes and transregional administration are increasingly socialised different from their state-based counterparts.…”

Section: Pp At a Crossroadmentioning

confidence: 99%

The demand for IPE and public policy in the governance of global policy design

Higgott¹,

Woo

Legrand

2021

Policy and Society

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The first decade of the 21st century recognised the growing salience of transnational or global governance as an analytical field of inquiry and as a normative project. In this introductory article, we argue that IPE offers a wider and deeper contextual understanding of the ‘global’ in a way that the scholarship of international relations, on the one hand, and that of international economics, on the other, have not done. IPE has been less strong in the context of global policy analysis that faut de mieux and, rather strangely, has been left largely to the economics discipline as other disciplines have slowly ceded the policy playing field to economics – at times with disastrous outcomes for policy. In light of these strengths and weaknesses of IPE as a framework for policy analysis, greater efforts at triangulating the insights of IPE and global public policy may help provide richer and more nuanced analyses of policy and politics.

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“…This threefold framework is particularly appropriate with respect to shadow banking, where positive regulatory agency requires the coordination of several actors on complex and sensitive regulatory matters that are of extraordinary complex nature. On one hand, policy networks become more independent from outside influences through the use of common language and skill set as factors facilitating coordination (Peterson, 2003; Seabrooke and Tsingou, 2009). On the other hand, issue complexity as well as politicization are factors identified as hampering coordination.…”

Section: Placing Policymaker’s Agency In Their Historical Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

When Brussels meets shadow banking – Technical complexity, regulatory agency and the reconstruction of the shadow banking chain

Endrejat

Thiemann

2020

Competition & Change

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At the heart of the last financial crisis stood the shadow banking system, a mesh of financial activities and entities that grew outside of bank balance sheets but with the support of the banking sector. These activities were not regulated or supervised like banks, and they were characterized by high maturity mismatches and leverage. Two prime elements were Money Market Mutual Funds and Asset-Backed Commercial Papers, which jointly performed bank-like functions. This paper sheds light on the fate of these entities post-crisis and the regulatory dynamics at play as policymakers shifted their focus from constraining their activities to drafting a European regulatory infrastructure that delivers both stability and growth. Based on expert interviews and document analysis, we show how European policymakers opened up to private experts during this shift to learn about the technical complexity of Money Market Mutual Funds and Asset-Backed Commercial Papers, but in the end were restricted in their efforts to craft such regulation due to competing national factions and the legislative time pressure at the European level. We argue that the process was heavily influenced by, first, nationally held visions about the future role of financial markets that came to the fore at pivotal moments during the negotiations, and, second, the specific European institutional set-up and its electoral cycle.

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Revolving doors in international financial governance

Cited by 46 publications

References 99 publications

Professional action in global wealth chains

Professional action in global wealth chains

The demand for IPE and public policy in the governance of global policy design

When Brussels meets shadow banking – Technical complexity, regulatory agency and the reconstruction of the shadow banking chain

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