Revisiting Economic Sanctions Reconsidered

Abstract

Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott have written probably the most comprehensive empirical study of economic sanctions in their volume Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy. They conclude their analysis with several policy recommendations. However, there are problems with their empirical analysis that significantly affect these recommendations. To overcome these problems, I reanalyze their data using ordered logit estimation. In addition to modeling their policy recommendations, I add three hypotheses derived from the sanction literature. The results show that most of the relationships between the variables in their recommendations are insignificant, calling their accuracy and importance into question. In two cases, the original recommendations are accurate only when conditioned by other variables. Cooperation only has a negative effect on success when international organizations are not involved, and nations trying to subvert the sanctions only succeed when the target was originally dependent on the sender for its imports. I conclude by discussing the policy implications these findings have for the future use of economic sanctions.

Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness: Sensitivity Analysis Using New Data

“…Positive: Morgan and Schwebach (1997), Krustev (2007) McLean and Whang (2010) [+], Nooruddin (2002) Drury (1998) [0], Jing, Kaempfer and Lowenberg (2003) [−]…”

“…Negative: Morgan and Schwebach (1997), Drezner (1999) Jing, Kaempfer andLowenberg (2003) [+], Drury (1998) [0], Hufbauer et al (2007) [0], Morgan and Schwebach (1997) [−]…”

“…Sender Costs Recorded 1 if the cost to the sender was either severe or major (TIES) Smart/Targeted Sanction Positive: Morgan and Schwebach (1996), Cortright and Lopez (2002) Morgan and Schwebach (1996) [+], Shagabutdinova and Berejikian (2007) Miyagawa (1992), van Bergeijk (1994), Bonetti (1998) van Bergeijk (1994 [+], Hufbauer et al (2007) [+], Drury (1998) (Drezner 2003;Eaton and Engers 1992;Krustev 2010;Lacy and Niou 2004;Morgan and Miers 1999;Smith 1996). They suggest that sanctions policies might actually be more effective than the previous studies suggest, but to observe this, we also have to consider cases in which sanctions were threatened, but not imposed.…”

“…Recent research has convinced many scholars that sanctions can influence targets' behavior under identifiable conditions, however. Some have argued that the key variable in sanctions success is whether the costs to the target are sufficiently high (Doxey 1980;Drury 1998;Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990;Morgan and Schwebach 1997) while others have suggested that sanctions will work if they are "smart," that is, if sanctions are designed so that the costs are borne by the right people in the target state (Cortright and Lopez 2002;Morgan and Schwebach 1996). Drezner (1999) has argued that a key variable in determining sanctions outcomes is the extent to which the sender and target expect to be involved in future conflicts.…”

“…1 For example, Drezner (1999) and Allen (2005Allen ( , 2008 find that sanctions against allies are more likely to succeed, but Drury (1998) and Krustev and Morgan (2011) find no support for this claim, and Nooruddin (2002) and Early (2011) find that sanctions against allies are less likely to succeed for US sanctions. Even when we consider the cost of sanctions, which many see as the most important predictor of sanctions success, the empirical findings are not conclusive (Bonetti 1998;Jing, Kaempfer, and Lowenberg 2003;Nooruddin 2002).…”