Return Window Decision in A Distribution Channel

Ma, Buqing; Di, Chenchen; Hsiao, Liang‐Tsai

doi:10.1111/poms.13201

Cited by 30 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…Yang et al (2020) [50] consider whether a manufacturer authorizes services for two competing retailers to study the manufacturer's service provision strategy in competitive channels. [28] find that the return window can be longer in the presence of competitive channels than in a centralized channel. At present, [36] empirically examine the influence of the store entry effect on online shopping in the presence of retail channel competition.…”

mentioning

confidence: 82%

The impact of online referral services on cooperation modes between brander and platform

Chu

Zhou

2023

JIMO

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The prevalent platform retailing has prompted branders to consider whether to expand their marketplace channel and adopt online referral services to improve performance. In this context, we develop a setting in which a brander sells a product directly by its official website, a manufacturer provides a substitutable product for a platform that additionally provides an online referral service. Then, a stylized model is established to investigate whether a brander should introduce a marketplace channel when a platform provides the online referral service. The results show that the brander always trends to join the platform if the price competition is intense, and the online referral service is an alternative option and improves a limited total demand for the brander. Moreover, the platform can take advantage of the online referral service as a tool to deal with the brander's marketplace channel intrusion. When the price competition is relatively weak and the platform's initial market share is moderate, both the brander and the platform choose Brander-Marketplace-Reseller with Service Mode to achieve a win-win situation; Otherwise, Brander-Marketplace-Reseller without Service Mode achieves a win-win situation. The platform should strategically choose to provide the online referral service for the brander as the platform fee increases.

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confidence: 82%

The impact of online referral services on cooperation modes between brander and platform

Chu

Zhou

2023

JIMO

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“…Letizia et al (2018) show that the product's marginal value and the salvage value of product returns determine whether the seller sells the product through both online and retail channels or online channels only. Focusing on the return window decision, Ma et al (2020) examine the effects of return policies on firms with either a centralized or decentralized channel. Third, for returns and product assortments, Alptekinoglu and Grasas (2014) find that when the product refund amount is sufficiently low, the optimal product assortment includes the most popular and the least popular products.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

A study about return policies in the presence of consumer social learning

Liu

Zhu

Shen

et al. 2022

Production and Operations Management

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Sellers are conventionally generous with their return policies for valuation‐uncertain products, such as experience products and new products. However, with the development of online review platforms, an increasing number of consumers are engaging in social learning by referring to others' reviews to reduce valuation uncertainty. In this study, we investigate how social learning interacts with sellers' return policies. There are three main conclusions. First, when sellers have a relatively higher expectation of product quality (or simply the product quality is high), social learning makes the sellers offering either no‐refund policies or partial‐refund policies better off in terms of the increased profit. It will cause the no‐refund sellers to choose higher prices and inventory, and the partial‐refund sellers to set lower prices and refund amounts. Second, under social learning, the partial‐refund policy tends to be more beneficial to sellers than both full‐refund and no‐refund policies; although, when the product quality is high, the no‐refund policy tends to bring more benefits to sellers than the full‐refund policy. Hence, sellers may finally switch to the partial‐refund policy. Third, for partial‐refund policies, more often than not, social learning increases social welfare when the product quality is high; specifically, in many cases, it increases not only the profit of the seller but also the welfare of consumers.

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“…Following the study by Ma et al (2020), we use T ∈ [0, 1] to denote the return window. When T is larger, a consumer has a higher probability to return the product when she is not satisfied with the product.…”

Section: Extensionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Our finding can complement the literature on return window by investigating the return window decision in the agency selling. Ma et al (2020) consider the decisions on the return window and the quality in the centralized scenario and the decentralized scenario with the wholesale price contract. In contrast with their study, we find that the optimal return window in the agency selling is generally longer than that in the centralized channel, as summarized in Corollary 4.…”

Section: Return Windowmentioning

confidence: 99%

Commission, product quality and return policy in agency selling

Hsiao

Chen

Xiong

2022

Naval Research Logistics

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Many sellers provide products for consumers directly on online platforms. This selling format is labeled “agency selling.” In this article, we investigate the platform's contract design and the seller's quality and return decisions in the agency selling. We find that the platform chooses a high commission rate to induce the seller to accept returns when the salvage factor is large enough or the consumers' willingness to pay for quality is sufficiently low. Compared to the direct channel, the seller is more likely to accept returns in the agency selling. Moreover, if the consumers' willingness to pay for quality increases, the platform intends to reduce the commission rate to induce the seller to increase the quality. The commission rate makes no influence on the generosity of the refund. However, when the consumers' willingness to pay for quality is sufficiently large, the platform prefers the seller to offer no refund and the commission rate may increase in the consumers' willingness to pay for quality. Finally, we consider two extensions: quality affects satisfaction probability and return window.

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Return Window Decision in A Distribution Channel

Cited by 30 publications

References 36 publications

The impact of online referral services on cooperation modes between brander and platform

The impact of online referral services on cooperation modes between brander and platform

A study about return policies in the presence of consumer social learning

Commission, product quality and return policy in agency selling

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