Retrospective Economic Voting and the Intertemporal Dynamics of Electoral Accountability in the American States

Krause, George A.; Melusky, Benjamin

doi:10.1017/s0022381614000450

Cited by 5 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 43 publications

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“…The reward–punishment model has been widely studied by the economic voting literature, which assumes that voters will sanction or reward incumbents in elections according to their performance on the economy or other policy areas (Paldam ; Powell and Whitten ). The recurrent finding is that voters mainly use retrospective rather than prospective evaluations (Calvert and Ferejohn ; Kramer ; Krause and Melusky ) and that they mostly rely on sociotropic evaluations of the economy rather than on egotropic ones (Kinder and Kiewiet , ; Lewis‐Beck ).…”

Section: Theoretical Framework: Territorial Identities and Blame Attrmentioning

confidence: 99%

Nested or exclusive? The role of identities on blame attribution during the Great Recession

Guinjoan

Bermúdez

2019

Nations and Nationalism

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Despite an increasing number of studies assessing the importance of institutions as regards to accountability, it still remains to be known whether and how an individual's national and regional identity shapes the attribution of responsibilities in multi‐level settings. By focusing on the economic crisis that affected Europe since 2008, we argue that identity‐based assessments of responsibility for the crisis will occur solely among individuals who hold exclusively national or regional identities and who live in regions that have nationalist aspirations. This will be in contrast to individuals that have exclusively identities who live in regions that lack nationalist aspirations, as well as dual‐identity individuals, irrespective of where they live. We test our arguments by using data from Catalonia and Madrid (Spain) and Bavaria and Lower Saxony (Germany). In line with our expectations, our results show that, in minority nationalist regions such as Catalonia, an individual's identity will crucially determine which level of government is blamed for the economic crisis, while this will not occur in regions with no nationalist aspirations. The article reveals the existence of an additional determinant of blame attribution in some specific multi‐level arrangements and contributes to the understanding of the tensions between identity politics and blame avoidance.

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Section: Theoretical Framework: Territorial Identities and Blame Attrmentioning

confidence: 99%

Nested or exclusive? The role of identities on blame attribution during the Great Recession

Guinjoan

Bermúdez

2019

Nations and Nationalism

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“…Although voters are typically argued to base their vote on retrospective evaluations of the economy (Becher & Donnelly ; Healy & Lenz ; Krause & Melusky ), the media coverage generated by social pact agreements may result in more positive evaluations of the economy and thus also governing parties (Soroka et al. ).…”

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confidence: 99%

Trying not to lose: The electoral consequences of unilateral reform efforts and the social pact formation process

Castater

Han

2017

European J Political Res

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Abstract. The existing social pact literature claims that governing parties offer social pact proposals because they anticipate they will receive an electoral benefit from social pact agreements. Yet the available data on social pacts inform us that in a substantial minority of cases social pact proposals fail to become social pact agreements. In an effort to better determine the political calculations made by governments before they propose a social pact, this article examines the effect of implementing reform legislation unilaterally, social pact proposals, social pact proposal failures and social pact agreements on the vote share of government parties in 15 Western European countries between 1981 and 2006. It is found that social pact proposals do not have any electoral consequences for governing parties, unilateral legislation and social pact proposal failures reduce the vote share of governing parties, and social pact agreements provide an electoral benefit to parties in minority governments only. These findings suggest that governing parties propose social pacts in a good faith effort to complete a social pact agreement; and that such an agreement is not a way for these parties to gain votes, but to avoid the electoral punishment associated with enacting unpopular reforms unilaterally.

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Studying Governors over Five Decades

Bernick

2016

State and Local Government Review

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Governors are the most prominent political actor in state politics and a subject of continuous study by scholars. An analysis of the research produced over the past five decades reveals a pattern of topics investigated as well as trends in interest level of those topics. A brief review of some of the findings is presented as well as suggestions for additional research. Finally, a proposal to rethink how we study and evaluate governors is offered.

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Retrospective Economic Voting and the Intertemporal Dynamics of Electoral Accountability in the American States

Cited by 5 publications

References 43 publications

Nested or exclusive? The role of identities on blame attribution during the Great Recession

Nested or exclusive? The role of identities on blame attribution during the Great Recession

Trying not to lose: The electoral consequences of unilateral reform efforts and the social pact formation process

Studying Governors over Five Decades

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