“Retribution Must Succeed Rebellion”: The Colonial Origins of Counterinsurgency Failure

Abstract

What can explain the decline in incumbent victory in counterinsurgency wars? Political scientists offer a variety of explanations for these trends+ Some focus on the structure and doctrine of counterinsurgent forces, while others emphasize the lethality and motivation of insurgent adversaries+ I challenge these explana-tions+ Declines in incumbent victory in counterinsurgency wars are not driven by fundamental shifts in the character of these conflicts, but in the political context in which they take place+ Nineteenth-century colonial incumbents enjoyed a variety of political advantages-including strong political will, a permissive international environment, access to local collaborators, and flexibility to pick their battles-which granted them the time and resources necessary to meet insurgent challenges+ In contrast, twentieth-century colonial incumbents struggled in the face of apathetic publics, hostile superpowers, vanishing collaborators, and constrained options+ The decline in incumbent victory in counterinsurgency warfare, therefore, stems not from problems in force structure or strategy, but in political shifts in the profitability and legitimacy of colonial forms of governance+ What explains the shift in the effectiveness of counterinsurgency operations over time? Why did nineteenth-century incumbents have an easier time defeating insurgent opponents than their twentieth-century counterparts? These questions drive much of the recent work on counterinsurgency and asymmetric conflict+ Lyall and Wilson, for example, find that incumbents defeated insurgent foes "in nearly 81 percent of pre-World War I cases but in only 40 percent of the post-World War I cases+" 1 Arreguín-Toft likewise finds that powerful states were victorious in 88 percent of their asymmetric conflicts in the first fifty years of the nineteenth century, compared to just 49 percent in the last fifty years of the twentieth century+ 2 Thank you to

Political Devolution and Resistance to Foreign Rule: A Natural Experiment

“…Examining Chechnya, Lyall (2010) finds that Chechen counterinsurgent sweeps were more effective at reducing insurgent violence when compared to sweeps carried out by Russians. This is consistent with MacDonald (2013)’s emphasis on the importance of native collaborators in colonial counterinsurgency efforts, as well as recent evidence that suggests that civilian defense units increase the probability of counterinsurgent success (Peic 2014). Coethnics may be particularly effective as counterinsurgents because informational advantages allow them to be more selective (Lyall 2010), avoiding the negative repercussions created by indiscriminate violence (e.g., Kalyvas 2006; Kalyvas and Kocher 2007).…”

“…While some studies suggest that the identity of those in control should be of little significance so long as they possess strong coercive capacity (Kalyvas 2006;Liberman 1996), others suggest that devolution can play a key role in limiting resistance to foreign rule (Edelstein 2008, Hechter, Matesan, andHale 2009). Even if devolving authority does reduce resistance, the causal mechanisms remain unclear, with some scholars arguing that native rule dampens nationalist motivations to resist (Edelstein 2008, Hechter, Matesan, andHale 2009), while other work stresses native advantages in counterinsurgency (Lyall 2010, MacDonald 2013. These disagreements are not limited to academia.…”

Military Technology and the Duration of Civil Conflict

“…As we have noted, the theory presented in this paper is a theory about the effects of military technology on the duration of civil conflicts -not their outcomes. Whereas the debate about military mechanization has focused primarily on whether mechanized militaries win or lose (Lyall and Wilson 2009;Smith and Toronto 2010;Friedman 2011;MacDonald 2013), our interest is in whether such militaries fight longer conflicts. Nevertheless, the outcomes of 25 Other studies have also found inconclusive evidence regarding the impact of lootable resources.…”

Force structure and counterinsurgency outcome: the case of the Cyprus Emergency (1955-1959)

“…According to some critics, counterinsurgency success became less likely in the twentieth-century because of changing political conditions. Specifically, the rise of the self-determination principle in the state system enhanced insurgents' international legitimacy, made local elites reluctant to collaborate, and inhibited coercion against insurgents (Smith and Toronto 2010, 523;MacDonald 2013). Lyall and Wilson acknowledged these obstacles, but they insisted that armies relying on manpower are still more likely to win (2009: 87).…”

“…Yet, research on the impact of mechanization on counterinsurgency outcomes has overlooked within-case analysis to test the causal logic of the thesis. 5 Interestingly, even critics retained a predominantly quantitative approach (Friedman 2011;MacDonald 2013) or performed no case studies (Smith and Toronto 2010).…”