Research on the evolution of participants collaboration mechanism in PPP model based on computer simulation: based on the old community renovation project

Guo, Bin; Li, Jiamin

doi:10.1007/s11227-018-2631-z

Cited by 20 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…The strategy choice of investors and the public depended on the strategy of the government. The final operation of PPP project depended on the cost and benefit of all parties [20]. Li et al found that the supervision strategy was not chosen when the supervision cost of government supervision department was greater than the supervision benefit; it could make private sector consciously provide the high-quality public products/services with the improvement of public participation level [21].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Evolutionary Game of Stakeholders’ Coordination Mechanism of New Energy Power Construction PPP Project: A China Case

Gao

2020

Sustainability

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The government, investors, and the public have formed a dynamic multi-game relationship on the Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) project, but few studies include them in a system to study their win–win solutions. Firstly, we constructed a tripartite game model of the government, investors, and the public based on evolutionary game theory. Secondly, the evolutionary process of tripartite strategy behaviors was studied with the system dynamics (SD) model. Finally, the impact of changes in key factors on behavior strategies was studied through sensitivity analysis. The results show the following: (1) In the outsourcing of new energy and power construction PPP projects, the three parties will eventually reach the equilibrium state of {government supervision, public participation, investors effort}, the three parties achieve a win–win situation and the project benefits are the highest at this time, and the public participation will play an important role in promoting the smooth outsourcing of PPP projects. (2) The strategic choices of the government, investors, and the public are sensitive to changes in the corresponding exogenous variables. (3) The security factor plays a crucial role in the choice of public strategy. The public’s choice is not only affected by its own income and cost, but also by the amount of compensation promised by the government and the estimated damage caused by the investor.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Evolutionary Game of Stakeholders’ Coordination Mechanism of New Energy Power Construction PPP Project: A China Case

Gao

2020

Sustainability

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“…System dynamics is a quantitative simulation method to analyze information feedback mechanism, which is often used to study complex systems [ 11 , 57 ]. In previous studies, given the complex nonlinear relationship among multiplayer evolutionary game players, SD has been applied to simulate the stability of the equilibrium solution of multiplayer evolutionary games, such as resource allocation [ 58 ], public-private partnership projects [ 59 ], environmental regulation [ 60 ], and safety regulation [ 11 ]. Therefore, based on the stakeholders’ feedback behaviors in the evolutionary game model analyzed above, SD was applied to simulate and validate the evolutionary game process and analyze the implementation effect and equilibrium state of different supervision strategies.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Developing a Dynamic Supervision Mechanism to Improve Construction Safety Investment Supervision Efficiency in China: Theoretical Simulation of Evolutionary Game Process

Gong

Gao

Zhou

et al. 2021

IJERPH

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The construction industry suffers from poor safety performance caused by the joint effect of insufficient safety investment by contractors and inefficient safety supervision by the government because of the information gap between the two sides. The present study aims to put forward a new pathway to improve safety investment supervision efficiency and analyze the decision-making interactions of stakeholders under this new pathway. For this purpose, this study establishes a safety investment information system to eliminate the information gap between the government and contractors for construction projects in China and further develops a dynamic safety investment supervision mechanism based on this. Evolutionary game theory is used to describe the decision-making interactions among stakeholders under the current static supervision mechanism and the dynamic supervision mechanism proposed in this research. Moreover, system dynamics is adopted to simulate the evolutionary game process and analyze the supervision effect and equilibrium state of different supervision mechanisms. The results reveal that the proposed safety investment information system could facilitate the transition of the supervision mode from static to dynamic; the evolutionarily stable strategy does not exist in the current static penalty scenario; and the dynamic supervision mechanism that correlates penalties with contractors’ unlawful behavior probability can restrain the fluctuation of the evolutionary game model effectively and the players’ strategy choices gradually stabilize in the equilibrium state. The results validate the effectiveness of the proposed dynamic supervision mechanism in improving supervision efficiency. This study not only contributes to the literature on safety supervision policy-making but also helps to improve supervision efficiency in practice.

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“…Liu et al establish a multiple agent's evolutionary game model that includes carbon fiber production enterprises, carbon fiber application enterprises, and governments and analyze the influencing factors of collaborative innovation in the carbon fiber industry to alleviate the problem of industry chain disconnection and promote sustainable development of the carbon fiber industry [35]. Guo and Li construct a tripartite evolutionary game model between the government, private sector, and owners and combine SD to simulate the evolution process, which can be helpful to explore the collaboration mechanism of participants in the PPP model of the old community renovation project [36]. Based on the mixed development environment of cascade hydropower stations, Chen et al establish a tripartite evolutionary game model, which aims to explore the directions and conditions for cooperative and noncooperative strategies evolving into steady states and promote the joint operation of cascade hydropower stations [37].…”

Section: Tripartite Evolutionary Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game Models on Multiagent Collaborative Mechanism in Responsible Innovation

Yang

Wang

2020

Scientific Programming

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Innovation is a game process; in particular, the behavior among multiple agents in responsible innovation is susceptible to the influence of benefits, risks, responsibilities, and other factors, resulting in unstable collaborative relationships. Therefore, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model including the government, enterprises, and the public, combined with system dynamics modeling to simulate and analyze the tripartite behavior strategy and sensitivity to relevant exogenous variables. The study shows that the tripartite game eventually converges to a stable state of the government active supervision, enterprises making responsible innovation, and the public’s positive participation. The positive participation of the public drives rapidly the game to a steady state, while the behavioral strategies of enterprises are more susceptible to the behavior of the government. Supervision cost, penalty amount, and value compensation are the most critical factors influencing the change of the corresponding agents’ behavior strategy, and the final strategic stability of tripartite is affected by multiple exogenous variables.

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Research on the evolution of participants collaboration mechanism in PPP model based on computer simulation: based on the old community renovation project

Cited by 20 publications

References 4 publications

The Evolutionary Game of Stakeholders’ Coordination Mechanism of New Energy Power Construction PPP Project: A China Case

The Evolutionary Game of Stakeholders’ Coordination Mechanism of New Energy Power Construction PPP Project: A China Case

Developing a Dynamic Supervision Mechanism to Improve Construction Safety Investment Supervision Efficiency in China: Theoretical Simulation of Evolutionary Game Process

Evolutionary Game Models on Multiagent Collaborative Mechanism in Responsible Innovation

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