Rescuing Basic Equality

Abstract

In the debate on the basis of moral equality, one conclusion achieves near consensus: that we must reject all accounts that ground equality in the possession of some psychological capacity (Psychological Capacity Accounts). This widely held view crystallises around three objections. The first is the Arbitrariness Objection, which holds that the threshold at which the possession of the relevant capacities places an individual within the required range is arbitrary. The second is the Variations Objection, which holds that there is rational pressure to acknowledge that variations in psychological capacities between individuals are morally relevant. The third is the No Rational Agency Objection, according to which Psychological Capacity Accounts have unpalatable implications for our treatment of humans who do not possess the relevant capacities. We develop a Psychological Capacity Account based on the capacity for a conception of the good and offer a novel defence of the account against these objections.

Misadventures of Sentience: Animals and the Basis of Equality

“…Unsurprisingly, the proposal of adopting a range property as a basis of equality has been greeted with a barrage of standard objections such as arbitrariness of the threshold, variability above the threshold, and exclusivity. I draw on the three standard objections outlined by Parr and Slavny [2]. However, I reformulate their third objection by widening its scope beyond humanity in terms of Exclusivity.…”

Abortion and the basis of equality: a reply to Miller

“…Part of the problem with adequately assessing this question, however, is that the notion of ‘equality’ is notoriously difficult to define 2–5. Moreover, since Miller never provides an account of what he means by the term, it is hard to assess the merits of his concern.…”

Harsh and Disrespectful

“…This question of "basic equality" has been comparatively neglected in political philosophy. However, a promising range of replies are grounded in moral agency (Carter 2011;Parr & Slavny 2019;Rawls 1971, §77;Williams 2005). What makes it appropriate to include persons (and only persons) within the scope of egalitarian justice, according to this view, is that persons are moral agents and that this commands a certain treatment.…”