volume 11, issue 7, Pe0155703 2016
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0155703
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Abstract: Despite the popularity of the notion that social cohesion in the form of dense social networks promotes cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemmas through reputation, very little experimental evidence for this claim exists. We address this issue by testing hypotheses from one of the few rigorous game-theoretic models on this topic, the Raub & Weesie model, in two incentivized lab experiments. In the experiments, 156 subjects played repeated two-person PDs in groups of six. In the “atomized interactions” condition, sub…

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