Reputation and the “need for enemies”

Abstract

A reputation of competence in solving a particular problem is useful only if the problem remains in the future. Hence, there is an incentive to keep the "enemy" alive: an agent may do wrong in his or her job precisely because he or she is competent. The paper develops this mechanism in a general career concerns framework and shows that a tradeoff between reputation and the need for enemies emerges. As a result, agents are induced to produce only moderate effort, and only moderately skilled agents are likely to be appointed. Implications of the analysis are discussed in a multitasking environment with incomplete transparency. Some evidence in principal-agent relationships and the political arena is presented to illustrate our theory.

Formation and Assessment of the Investment and Reputation Capital of the Enterprise

“…Настоящее исследование базируется на основных положениях теории капитала (В. В. Ковалев [1], О. В. Ефимова, М. В. Мельник [2]), оценки деловой репутации предприятия (И. С. Важенина [3], A. Вех [4], M. Менуэт [5], Е. Д. Щетинина, Е. А. Щетинина [6]), стейкхолдерском подходе (В. Г. Когденко, М. В. Мельник [7]), концепции интегрированной отчетности (Н. В. Малиновская [8]). Научные публикации описывают экономическую роль капитала для развития корпоративных структур, аккумулирующих финансовые инвестиции, систематизируют факторы и компоненты деловой репутации.…”