Rent-Seeking Decisions of the Main Participants in Construction Projects Based on Evolutionary-Game and System Dynamics

Abstract

The performance of a construction project can be severely harmed by its participants’ rent-seeking. In order to prevent such attempt, this research integrates the evolutionary game theory with system dynamics method to simulate the impact of the change of some factors that may cause/reduce rent-seeking. Based on the analysis of the behavioral characteristics and interactive relationships of the main participants (the owner, supervisor, and contractor), an evolutionary game model is constructed and simulated with the method of system dynamics based on the replication dynamic equation of the mixed strategy solution of the three-party static game model. By assigning the parameters of project scale, supervision likelihood, supervision success rate, supervision cost, and penalty intensity, the interaction mechanism of the participants on each factor is revealed through a case-based simulation. The results show that the impacts of these factors on participants’ rent-seeking decisions are significantly different. Furthermore, some management suggestions are provided to prevent rent-seeking for project owner according to the research conclusions. This research can help the project owners take proper measures to prevent rent-seeking of the supervisors and the contractors to improve the performances of the projects.

The Environmental Influencing Factors of the Realization of Engineering Construction Harmony from the Perspective of Ren–Shi–Wu: Evidence from China

“…(1) Ren Harmony (RH) "Ren" is the most dominant factor in engineering construction harmony, with multidimensional attributes such as "economic man", "social man", and "complex man" [1]. The ideology, values, professional ethics, work attitude, and interpersonal skills of "Ren" collectively determine the connotation and extension of "Ren harmony".…”

“…This study explores the impacts of the three subsystems of RH, WH, and SH on engineering harmony, as well as the moderating effects of external environmental factors such as natural ecology, social humanities, and political economy on engineering harmony. But the limitations of the topic are as follows: (1) The sample data are mainly collected in China, and future research should expand the research objects, including foreign practitioners and researchers. (2) The original data came from the questionnaire, which may have subjective bias; thus, future works can try to use practical engineering cases to study environmental influencing factors of the realization of engineering construction harmony.…”

“…Many stakeholders are involved in the project, including owners, design, construction, and supervision, as well as the government and relevant people [1]. Meanwhile, the objectives that need to be controlled in engineering management involve quality, duration, cost, safety, etc.…”

“…According to the doctoral thesis [12], the contents of engineering construction harmony include (1) "Ren harmony", which is the coordination of multi-agent interests of "Ren" in engineering organization [1]; (2) "Wu harmony", which is the multi-constraint objective balance of the project and its "Wu" elements [13]; and (3) "Shi harmony", which is the matching of "Shi" elements such as engineering construction technology and management methods [14]. Then, on the basis of the three subsystems of RH, WH, and SH, the harmony between the subsystems and the external environmental factors of natural ecology, social humanities, and political economy is realized so as to achieve engineering construction harmony under the joint action of Ren, Shi, and Wu. In all, the subsystems of "Ren-Shi-Wu" are restricted by the external environmental factors of natural ecology, social humanities, and political economy.…”

Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Healthcare Fraud Supervision under the Government Reward and Punishment Mechanism

“…Also, the hospital bribed the third party in order not to be supervised, so there is rent-seeking behavior on behalf of the hospital in this game relationship. Tripartite evolutionary game is an effective method to study the dynamic changes of multi-agent strategies with bounded rationality in long-term repeated games, which is applicable to the study of rent-seeking behavior [ 44 , 45 ]. Hence, this study intends to apply the tripartite evolutionary game to examine the supervision of healthcare fraud.…”