Reconsidering Relational Autonomy. Personal Autonomy for Socially Embedded and Temporally Extended Selves

Abstract

Most recent accounts of personal autonomy acknowledge that the social environment a person lives in, and the personal relationships she entertains, have some impact on her autonomy. Two kinds of conceptualizing social conditions are traditionally distinguished in this regard: Causally relational accounts hold that certain relationships and social environments play a causal role for the development and on-going exercise of autonomy. Constitutively relational accounts, by contrast, claim that autonomy is at least partly constituted by a person’s social environment or standing. The central aim of this paper is to raise the question how causally and constitutively relational approaches relate to the fact that we exercise our autonomy over time. I argue that once the temporal scope of autonomy is opened up, we need not only to think differently about the social dimension of autonomy. We also need to reconsider the very distinction between causally and constitutively relational accounts, because it is itself a synchronic (and not a diachronic) distinction.

Updating our Selves: Synthesizing Philosophical and Neurobiological Perspectives on Incorporating New Information into our Worldview

“…In the same way that the historical externalist condition responds to the idea that we do not want our pro-attitudes to be determined by external circumstances, the experience-responsive condition responds to the idea that we do not want them to be unaffected or incapable of being affected by relevant changes in the dynamic world around us. These conditions are consistent with the idea that a complete theory of autonomy must "avoid the consequence that persons are 'caught up in themselves' as well as that they are 'caught up in society'", as Baumann puts it [17]. We suggest a further qualification: that normative theories of autonomy should meet a threshold of minimum neuroscientific realism by being compatible with what is known about how the brain functions [10] 2 .…”

“…Taking seriously the fact that we exercise our autonomy over time requires us to supplement our theories with a recognition that "we have a history and a future, that we develop our identities and emancipate ourselves from others over time, that we sometimes change our minds and take different directions, that we find ourselves in changing relationships and social environments, etc." [17]. One way to think about this issue in a tangible way is to consider what impact this recognition might have for a widely acknowledged stable component of autonomous agency; and critical reflection is an obvious contender.…”

Ethics in cross-cultural encounters: a medical concern?

“…In culturally complex societies, we can observe promising efforts to promote equitable healthcare services 29. Moreover, as the concept of individual autonomy does not resonate well everywhere, ‘relational autonomy’ has entered discussions on individualisation and personalisation 30–3334 we need to observe the variation regarding the content of medical oaths due to different times, situations, religions and political systems.…”

Responsibility: From its conceptual foundations to its practical application in intensive care units

“…In our opinion this relational component of autonomy is just the same as the aforementioned concept of responsible autonomy being aligned with the so-called "alternative model of autonomy", i.e., relational autonomy. This concept highlights the social and interpersonal extend within all individuals exist and acknowledges the emotional and embodied aspects of decision-makers (41)(42)(43)(44). A relational autonomy approach takes full consideration to the central role of 'others', including their narratives (45), in the decision-making process, highlighting the complex dimension and framework of end of life decisions and including physicians and health professionals' role and their responsibility.…”