Rational imitation in preverbal infants

Abstract

Here we show that if an adult demonstrates a new way to execute a task to a group of infants aged 14 months, the children will use this action to achieve the same goal only if they consider it to be the most rational alternative. Our results indicate that imitation of goal-directed action by preverbal infants is a selective, interpretative process, rather than a simple re-enactment of the means used by a demonstrator, as was previously thought.

Children’s understanding of directed motion events in an imitation choice task

“…However, this hypothesis does not obviously predict one of our central findings, namely, the fact that the children showed an overall bias towards the path information. As discussed in the introduction, previous work has found two main situations in which children prefer a non-goal interpretation: when the goal is absent (i.e., there is no visible external outcome of the action) as in Bekkering et ala (2000) and Pulverman et al (in press); and when the non-goal is specially highlighted as in Gergely et al (2002), and Williamson and Markman (2006). We consider next whether one of these situations holds in the current experiment.…”

“…Similarly, Williamson and Markman (2006) found that 3-year-olds were more likely to imitate an unusual action if they were provided with an explanatory context for it. And, in a completely opposite approach, Gergely, Bekkering and Kiraly (2002) found that 14-month-olds infants were much more likely to imitate a particular manner of action (such as turning on a light with their head) when it was an apparently irrational way of accomplishing the goal. The fact that the model had so clearly made a choice for the irrational action when a more rational alternative was available served to motivate the use of the action.…”

Why do dogs (Canis familiaris) select the empty container in an observational learning task?

“…In line with this later approach, recent studies provided evidence for the selective, inferential nature of the infants' imitation of goal-directed actions (Schwier et al 2006;Gergely et al 2002;Carpenter et al 1998;Carpenter et al 2002). Gergely et al ( 2002), for example, found that when an unusual, less efficient action (switching a light box on with the head) is demonstrated in a manner that is cognitively opaque to the infant (there is no obvious reason why the demonstrator did not use her hand, the familiar and clearly more efficient alternative means action), 14-monthold infants are willing to re-enact the observed head action. In contrast, if the demonstrator was prevented from using the efficient solution due to obvious physical reasons (i.e.…”

“…In contrast, presuming a mentalistic interpretive stance in infants, others argue that infants attribute different goals and intentions to the demonstrator depending on their physical constraints (Bekkering et al 2000;Carpenter et al 2002). In line with this later approach, recent studies provided evidence for the selective, inferential nature of the infants' imitation of goal-directed actions (Schwier et al 2006;Gergely et al 2002;Carpenter et al 1998;Carpenter et al 2002). Gergely et al ( 2002), for example, found that when an unusual, less efficient action (switching a light box on with the head) is demonstrated in a manner that is cognitively opaque to the infant (there is no obvious reason why the demonstrator did not use her hand, the familiar and clearly more efficient alternative means action), 14-monthold infants are willing to re-enact the observed head action.…”

Can infants attribute to an agent a disposition to perform a particular action?

“…Although at an abstract level goals and dispositions are conceptually distinct-for example, we would not want to say that a fondness for pecan pie is equivalent to a goal of eating pecan pie-at a more concrete level goals and dispositions are clearly intertwined: her fondness for pecan pie should lead our friend, once she reaches the buffet table and notices the pecan pie, to form a goal of obtaining a piece of the pie and to act in a manner consistent with this goal. In this sense, recognizing others' dispositions can thus help us make sense of their goal-directed actions.Recent research suggests that infants attribute not only goals (e.g., Csibra, Bíró, Koós, & Gergely, 2003;Csibra, Gergely, Bíró, Koós, & Brockbank, 1999;Gergely, Bekkering, & Kiraly, 2002;Gergely, Nadasdy, Csibra, & Biro, 1995;Meltzoff, 1995Meltzoff, , 1996Onishi, Baillargeon, & Woodward, 2005;Shimizu & Johnson, 2004;Song, Baillargeon, & Fisher, 2005;Thoermer & Sodian, 2001;Woodward, 1998Woodward, , 1999 but also dispositions (e.g., Kuhlmeier, Wynn, & Bloom, 2003; Luo & Baillargeon, 2005, in press;Onishi & Baillargeon, 2002;Premack & Premack, 1997;Song, et al, 2005) …”